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Abstract 
The 2008 global economic crisis marks the beginning of considerable systemic changes 
in global governance. The ‘Group of 20’ (G20), which entered the centre stage of global 
governance in response to the crisis, may be seen as both a result of and as a vehicle for 
those changes. Representing some 85 per cent of the global economy the group has the 
potential to alter the international order almost by stealth. Hence, there is good reason 
for undertaking a deeper examination of its role in and impact on global governance. 
This study critically examines some of the changes in global governance embodied – and 
brought about – by the G20. By using analytical tools from the critical theory of Robert 
Cox and constructivism, it studies changes in three dimensions of global governance: the 
material, the institutional and the ideational, so as to achieve a holistic understanding of 
the nature of the changes taking place within global governance. In so doing, the study 
sheds light on the role of the G20 in global governance, the impact of the group on global 
cooperation and the nature of the shift in global governance that it represents. 
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Opsomming 
Die 2008 globale ekonomiese krisis kan as die begin van aansienlike sistemiese 
veranderinge in globale regeerkunde beskou word. Die 'Groep van 20' (G20), wat in 
reaksie op die krisis ’n sentrale rol in globale regeerkunde ingeneem het, kan as beide 'n 
resultaat en drywer van hierdie veranderinge gesien word. Die groep verteenwoordig 
ongeveer 85 persent van die globale ekonomie, en het dus die potensiaal om 
grootskaalse verandering in die internasionale orde te weeg te bring. Dit is dus 
belangrik om die groep se rol in globale regeerkunde meer deeglik te ondersoek. Deur 
gebruik te maak van analitiese metodes wat gebasseer is op die kritiese teorie van 
Robert Cox asook konstruktivisme, ondersoek hierdie studie veranderinge in drie 
dimensies van globale regeerkunde. Materiële en institusionele veranderinge, asook   
veranderinge binne die dimensie van idees, word geïdentifiseer met die oog op 'n meer 
holistiese begrip van die aard van die veranderinge. Die studie werp daardeur lig op die 
rol van die G20 in globale regeerkunde, die groep se impak op globale samewerking, en 
die aard van die magsverskuiwing in globale regeerkunde wat dit verteenwoordig. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The G20 and Changes in Global Governance 
 
 
“Dramatic changes in the world economy have not always been reflected in the global 
architecture for economic cooperation. This all started to change today.” 
- The White House on the G20, after the Pittsburgh Summit 
(2009a) 
 
“There is a lot more systemic change than most had imagined there would be. The world 
stands at a critical juncture. We are likely to find ourselves looking back, and thinking: 
‘those were critical years’” 
- Yves Tiberghien (2011) 
 
 
Continued instabilities experienced in the global economy since the global economic 
crisis that began in 2007/2008 have brought issues of systemic change and global 
governance to the attention of mainstream media and created an increase in academic 
interest on the subject of global governance. Not only was it the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s; it also led to unprecedented efforts to 
coordinate national economic policy responses. The Group of 20 (G20) has been the 
cornerstone of this coordination, and the first convening of the group at the leaders’ 
level – that is, at the level of the heads of the executive branch of member countries1 – 
can be argued to mark the beginning of considerable systemic change within the 
structure of global governance. The issues dealt with by the group, and the level at – and 
frequency with – which its members meet, suggests that those changes are of 
                                                        
1 This is prime ministers, presidents and chancellors 
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quantitative as well as qualitative character. As the G20 represents some 85 per cent of 
the global economy (Forbes 2009), it has the potential to alter the international order 
almost by stealth. Hence, there is good reason for undertaking a deeper examination of 
the role of the group in global governance.  
 
While the G20 was established in 1999, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it was 
only in response to the financial crisis of 2008 that it emerged as a major player on the 
international stage. The group began a dual existence on November 14th-15th, 2008, 
when then United States President George W. Bush, together with his successor and 
president-elect Obama, invited the leaders of what is often described as the world’s 20 
most systemically significant economies to Washington D.C. for ‘The Leaders Summit on 
Financial Stability and the World Economy’. The latter has described G20 summitry as a  
“turning point in [the] pursuit of global economic recovery” (Kellerhals Jr., 2009), within 
which “unprecedented” action takes place (Obama 2009). He later expressed his view of 
the group as “[…] the premier forum for international economic cooperation” (White 
House 2010).  
 
The increased weight acquired by the G20 through summitry has provided room for a 
growing and lively debate. Some see the introduction of the group to global governance 
as the most significant alteration of international relations in decades (Shorr and Wright 
2010:181), while others remain more cautious about the implications of the entering of 
the G20 onto the centre stage of global governance (Wright 2010:185). Regardless, there 
is agreement amongst academics, as well as politicians and journalists that the group 
has the potential to alter the international order; its membership is unlike that of 
previous groups and its potential power is arguably unparalleled amongst the G’s. This, 
combined with a desire to probe into the nature of the changes that are, at least in the 
general perception, occurring in global governance provides the rationale for the 
present study. 
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1.2 Problem Statement and Research Aims 
The quote at the beginning of the introduction from a White House statement illustrates 
that the word ‘change’ – used twice in the sentence referred to – is central to many 
descriptions of the G20. The second quote on the ripple effect of the Global Economic 
Crisis, by Tiberghien, supports the argument and is representative of a growing 
scholarly interest in changes in the global system within which the group finds itself. In 
addition, more general media coverage of the group’s activity suggests that it has 
become fairly commonly accepted that it represents change. In fact, today it is difficult to 
stumble upon a text on the G20 without encountering the word ‘change’. Less, however, 
has been said on the nature of such change(s). For, while the term ‘change’ has 
frequently been used to describe developments within international relations in the new 
millennium – and has turned into a veritable buzzword under the Obama administration 
– surprisingly little effort has been made to qualify what is meant by it when it is used to 
describe the relationship between the G20 and global governance. Confronted with 
claims that the world is changing, it is necessary to launch an enquiry not only into 
whether change is taking place, but also how such change manifests itself.  This study 
endeavours to contribute to fill that void in the global governance literature, by 
providing a step along the way towards a more critical approach to the role of the G20. 
Specifically, the aim of this research is to explore the nature of the change(s) brought 
about and embodied by the group. 
 
This study is produced timeously, following the early incarnations of the G20 at the 
leaders’ level. As we approach a post-crisis reality, it is necessary to look more closely at 
the G20. What role is the group playing, and what role is it likely to fill in the future? 
Does the G20 mark a power shift in global governance? What are the implications of G20 
activity on global governance today, and what are they likely to be in the future? Is there 
at all, a future for the group? This study takes a closer look at what kinds of changes this 
new G20 ascendancy in global governance seems to result in. The aim of this thesis is 
thus to critically examine some of the changes in global governance embodied by, 
and emerging from, the creation of the G20 and its increasingly important role 
since the 2008 global economic crisis by deconstructing the perceived change and 
studying its elements. The premise of the thesis is that the application of critical theory 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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may provide us with a deeper insight into the nature of the changes embodied and 
provoked by the G20. Through critical application of theory to some of the changes 
motivating the creation of, and brought about by, the G20, this thesis seeks to contribute 
to the understanding of the evolving role of the G20 and its implications for 
international relations. 
 
Three sub-research questions receive particular attention. These are: 
1. What role does the G20 occupy in global governance? 
2. How does the G20 affect global cooperation?   
3. What kind of a shift in global governance relations does the G20 embody? 
 
The following section provides a brief and critical review of the written work on the 
topic of the changing role of the G20 and its impact on global governance. Additionally, it 
touches upon the theoretical toolbox from which the analysis of this study draws.  
 
1.3 Literature Review 
Global governance has long been an under-researched field of study in International 
Relations Theory and Global Political Economy (GPE) (Wright 2010: 181). The study of 
the new body of global governance that the G20 represents is not an exception in this 
regard. For instance, the literature dealing with global governance has yet to provide a 
comprehensive account of the role and nature of the G20. Until Cooper and Thakur 
publish their book The Group of Twenty (G20) in late January 20122, no in-depth 
standard work on the G20, be it at a finance ministers’ or at a leaders’ level is available. 
Owing to this, in part, and because critical engagement with the literature on the G20 is 
an integral part of the thesis per se, this presentation does not provide an extensive 
literature review in this first chapter, but merely sketches the contours of some of the 
main contributions to and challenges in the field. 
 
Perhaps the most widely quoted sources of information on the G20 have for some time 
been the Canadian G20 Research Group and the G20 papers of the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI). In addition, the International Institute for 
                                                        
2 See ‘Routledge (2011) in the reference list of this study for further information. 
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Strategic Studies (IIS) has produced papers on the G20 with some regularity. Today, the 
number of research institutions and universities including G20 into their research 
programmes is increasing rapidly. One of the more notable programmes producing 
some insightful reading on the G20 is the Global Economic Governance Programme of 
Oxford University – in which Ngaire Woods is a seminal figure. Some of these provide 
sophisticated and interesting perspectives on the G20 and its position in contemporary 
and future global governance.  
 
Even a quick glance at the plethora of literature covering various emerging issues in the 
face of important developments in the G20, reveals some traits worthy of note. Although 
the research institutions such as those mentioned above have provided important news 
and analysis of G20 activity since the group began to meet at a finance-minister level, the 
academic literature covering G20 activity remains relatively modest, measured in the 
numbers of publications. However, the concerns are not merely of a quantitative nature; 
the lack of literature specifically addressing issues surrounding developments in the role 
of the G20 has left central issues to be dealt with by non-academic sources of literature, 
such as newspaper articles, political commentaries, policy papers and the statements of 
various ‘political experts’ and blogs.  The qualitative concerns do not limit themselves to 
the surface-scratching nature of newspaper articles, blogs and shorter political 
commentaries, however, but extend also to more comprehensive sources of literature 
such as policy papers or shorter analyses of concrete cases. 
 
Another common factor in the research listed above suggests that there is an 
Anglophone, not to say North American, bias in the field of G20-studies. This does not 
only limit the number of viewpoints from which the G20 is studied, geographically and 
politically, but it might also place constraints on what theoretical approaches are taken. 
Thus far, studies exploring the G20, and its role and impact in the global governance 
architecture by use of analytical tools from within more critical strands of theory and 
constructivism have been scarce. Much of the literature on the G20 tends to be less 
conscious of the ontology and epistemologies underlying it than that of more critical 
academic literature. It becomes ever more evident, when critically engaging with 
writings on issues related to the evolving role of the G20, that the production of 
knowledge and information is no neutral act. The recognition that the vast bulk of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  6 
information in the field is produced in the Western hemisphere, and that much of this 
information is provided for – and sponsored by – policymaking bodies in Western states 
encourages a critical approach to the content and purpose of such information. I will 
argue that the relationship between ‘reality’ and studies of reality is bidirectional: the 
development of new policies, aimed at adapting to the shifting role of the G20 is based 
on available research. Hence, scholarly contributions to a field – consciously or not – 
inevitably contribute to the sketching of the ‘reality’ of the G20. For a comparatively new 
field, such as G20-studies, this is perhaps particularly true. The ‘truth’ of the G20 is in the 
making, and will shape the perceptions of key policy makers in the years to come. 
 
1.3.1 Theoretical framework 
While the assumptions underlying the realist worldview that long dominated 
International Relations (IR) theory leave little room for change in international 
relations3, the traditional counterparts of realists – liberalists4 – are more open to the 
possibilities of alterations of the international system and the behaviour of the actors 
within it. Contrary to realists5, who maintain that states are the sole significant actors on 
the international scene, liberalists also believe that international organisations, 
institutions and regimes may act as vehicles of such change (Keohane 1989:2; Nye, 
1993:38; Hovi and Underdal 2003; O’Brien and Williams 2007: 20-30). However, with 
ontologies that do not give attention to ideational dimensions of international relations, 
both realist and liberalist theory face considerable restraints in their ability to provide a 
comprehensive account for change6. Drawing much on analytical tools from the more 
established field of G7/8 studies, the main preoccupation of G20 studies relates to G20 
performance, capability, and legitimacy (See Helleiner and Pagliari 2008; Kirton 2009). 
Less attention has been paid to the effect of the G20 on global governance. Attempting to 
                                                        
3 The realist argument embraces an ahistorical approach to IR, in which by and large change does not 
occur. Instead, history repeats itself in a circular manner. See amongst others the writings of structural 
realist Kenneth Waltz (1979). 
4 Such as Deutsch et. Al (1957), Nye (1988), Keohane (1989), Moravscik (1997) and Ikenberry (2001) 
5 Such as Morgenthau (1960), Jervis (1976), Waltz (1979), Walt (1987), Van Evera (1999), Mearsheimer 
(2001) and Carr (1964) 
6 It is worth questioning whether debate between the modern versions of realism and liberalism – 
neoralism and neoliberalism – is at all one between two polar opposite worldviews. They share a common 
epistemology, focus on similar questions, and agree on a number of assumptions about international 
politics. Rather, it seems accurate to label it an inter-paradigm debate. Steven L. Lamy (2006: 206) 
describes the neo-neo debate as a debate between ‘rulemakers’, that leaves out the voices of the margins 
or the ‘ruletakers’.  
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begin to fill this gap, this research applies theory to a relatively un-theorised field of 
inquiry, thereby framing the ‘change(s)’ taking place theoretically. In so doing, it draws 
on rich bodies of literature on the study of change and the role of institutions in global 
governance. 
 
Seeking a more holistic approach to the study of the role of the G20 in the ongoing 
changes in global governance, this research draws from the postpositivist critical theory 
of Robert Cox, and also borrows analytical tools from within constructivist thought. As 
such, the theoretical approach of this study draws on analytical tools from within 
several postpositivist bodies of thought, rather than choosing one, overarching, 
theoretical body. This is built upon the belief that any critical study of change requires, 
as Susan Strange puts it “an imperative of multidisciplinarity” (Strange 1996: xv). Both 
acknowledging the constructed nature of international relations – where the reality of 
world politics is not given but is a product of history, human action and thought, and is 
subjectively interpreted – critical and constructivist theory offers a critical distance to 
the current configuration of international relations that makes them well suited for the 
study of change. Chapter 3 offers a thematically relevant presentation of the theoretical 
bodies and analytical tools used in the research. As that presentation reveals, Coxian 
Critical Theory7 and constructivism are central to the analytical approach of the study.  
 
Coxian critical theory understands the world as being made up of different and 
conflicting social and political forces, which function in alliances that cross state borders. 
Interests may be shared between – and solidarity may be felt amongst – groups across 
borders as well as within states. Cox is furthermore influenced by his tendency – 
perhaps particularly in earlier years (Cox in interview with Shouten 2009: 3) - to think 
about things in historical terms. Not merely history in the sense of what happened in the 
past, but rather history as a way of understanding processes that occur in the world. 
Inspired amongst others by Gramsci, Vico and Collingwood, Cox has developed an own 
sense of historical materialism. He draws a distinction between what Collingwood spoke 
of as the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of historical events (ibid.). When the positivist studies 
events by classifying and collecting data and drawing inferences from them, he sees the 
                                                        
7 A label to Cox’s theory originally coined by Leysens (2008), aimed at distinguishing it from small “c” 
critical approaches. 
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outside. The postpositivist concern with the ‘inside’ of events aims also to understand 
the meaning of things in terms of the thought-processes of the actors, and their 
understanding of the structure of relationships within which they exist. It is the hope of 
this research that it through paying attention also to the history of the G20 and global 
governance, and so also change, might come to shed some light on the meaning, or 
nature, of the changes occurring in global governance, and the role of the G20 in those 
changes.   
 
To constructivists, it is impossible to account for profound changes in international 
politics without taking a social dimension into account. Norms, culture and ideas play a 
significant role; a shift in the way one thinks of global governance may profoundly 
change the nature of such governance and vice versa. The famous words of Alexander 
Wendt (1992) that “anarchy is what states make of it”, imply that neither international 
history nor international politics are unchanging phenomena. Rather, considerable 
change becomes possible because people and states can start thinking about each other 
in new ways and thus create new norms that may be radically different from old ones.  
 
The fact that this study chooses to be guided by a critical approach should not be 
interpreted as arguing for critical theory to the exclusion of problem-solving theory. 
Taking the world as it is and focusing on correcting certain dysfunctions, or problems, 
problem-solving theories serve important purposes. Rather, the explanation for the 
critical inclination in choice of analytical tools is to be found in the purposes of the study. 
Because problem-solving theory has to take the basic existing power relationships as 
given, its tools do not allow for the examination of potentially important dimensions of 
change. If one wishes to study how the conditions that problem-solving theory takes as 
the given framework may be changing, critical theory offers a richer and more nuanced 
approach. 
 
1.4 Research Design and Sources of Information 
The present study has a qualitative research design and makes use of an inductive and 
critical approach, meaning that theory is developed as the data collection process 
evolves. Few standardised procedures were predetermined, and rather than to test a 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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hypothesis, the aim of the study was to generate hypotheses as the research proceeded. 
This, together with the choice of relying on critically oriented theory, was to safeguard 
to the extent possible, that the research was not biased towards the subjective 
assumptions of the researcher. A non-linear and circular research path ensured that new 
data was continuously collected that could shed light on the research question. As such, 
the research allowed both for switches in focus and changes in perceptions.   
 
Given the lack of standardised definitions of central terms and concepts with relation to 
the G20, the thesis has an important explorative dimension. There are several ways in 
which explorative research may be conducted (Selltiz et. al. 1965; Babbie and Mouton 
2001; Neuman 2006). The methods employed in covering the explorative parts of this 
study include a review of relevant theory and social science as well as an analysis of 
‘insight stimulating’ examples.  
 
While exploration is central to the aim of the thesis, the aim of theorising developments 
caused by G20 evolvement brings an important descriptive dimension to the study. 
Scientific description of the ‘change’ related to the G20 is, after all, the overarching aim 
of the thesis. The spectrum of descriptive studies includes a variety of types of research 
(Babbie and Mouton 2001:81). The present project relies, in part, on in-depth narrative 
description of the changes furthered by the G20.  
 
Compared to quantitative studies, strategies for analysis of qualitative data are more 
diverse, less standardised, and less explicitly outlined by the researcher (Neuman 2006: 
447). This should not, however, be interpreted to suggest that qualitative data analysis 
is a random process. The study has relied on a diverse body of data. In addition to 
official G20 and G7/8 documentation, the thesis has collected information from 
presidential, prime ministerial, as well as foreign, finance and other ministry archives. 
Generally, these archives provide access to first-hand accounts and yield the best and 
most reliable record of G20 meetings.  
 
As the study of perceptions is an important part of this research, it draws on a growing 
corpus of writings about various aspects of the G20. Contributions include compilations 
of texts of documents, government publications, including parliamentary reviews, 
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memoirs and other writing by prominent summit participants or other relevant people, 
and scholarly analysis in the form of articles. As previously noted, media-attention to the 
G20 has grown formidably over the past year and is of particular importance to the 
present study. Although documents released by the G20 system are the primary source 
material for studying the institution, the aim of this research is not to study the group 
per se, but the perceptions of it and the change related to it. Operating in a market partly 
subject to supply and demand, newspaper articles may be seen to express important 
perceptions of the G20. There are, however, some challenges related to the use of media 
accounts, which are mentioned in the subsequent section on limitations to the study. 
 
1.5 Limitations 
On the subject of news media accounts, quality of reportage is a subject worthy of 
comment. It is clear that there are knowledgeable reporters, particularly with prominent 
media such as the Financial Times and Le Monde Diplomatique. Some of them contribute 
to the academic body of literature as well. The late Susan Strange is an important 
example in this regard. Not all reporters covering G20 issues are equally well informed, 
however. As Hajnal (1999: 102) pointed out while studying the G7/8, some are often 
sent to the summit site by their news organisations simply because they are posted 
nearby and thus available at a lower cost; the results can be variable.  The lack of 
academic background of others also shows in their reporting, that can at times be less 
than critical. This, however, does not necessarily provide too much of an obstacle for the 
purpose of this thesis, as perceptions of the G20 are not reserved for the academic 
community. Rather, it is interesting to observe how the media of some of the world's 
main economic players strongly reflects their own countries' interests in their coverage 
of G20 summitry (BBC 2010). 
 
Another comment on the limitations of the data available may be made on electronic 
media. For, while the advent of electronic media has helped make information, 
documents, and resolutions of international organisations more widely available, it has 
also complicated matters. According to Braveboy-Wagner (2009: xii) the growing 
reliance on the Internet and other electronic methods of finding information about key 
international institutions and processes has, paradoxically, “served to limit the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  11 
educational materials to which most readers have ready access – namely, books”. This is 
particularly relevant to the study of the G20, where the purportedly independent web 
sites provided by the G20 Research Group, the CIGI, the IIS, and the Global Economic 
Governance Programme of Oxford University offer analysis of the activities of the G20. It 
is not unthinkable that one inadvertent consequence of these pages has been to frustrate 
the access to basic, authoritative, critical, and well-researched texts. In the view of 
Braveboy-Wagner (ibid.) the market for such has been reduced by the availability of 
varying quality electronic materials. 
 
This ties up with another important caveat to this study. Given its critical orientation, 
one should seek to remain critical not only of the G20 itself, but also to the study of it. 
Remaining critical to the published studies of the G20 is a challenging task, however, as 
the bulk of the available literature has been produced in the Western, Anglo-Saxon, 
hemisphere. A quick search on the mentioned Internet pages reveals that all the studies 
benefit from funds from within the Anglo-Saxon world. Moreover, both the G20 
Research Group and the Centre for International Governance Innovation receive support 
from Canadian authorities. The epistemological foundation of Coxian theory as ‘critical’ 
as opposed to ‘problem solving’ aids this study in remaining cautious of this. Yet, it 
should be noted that also Coxian theory traces its lineage in Western discourse. 
 
Following contemporary publications on the subject as a student of IR and GPE it is 
difficult not to be struck by the overwhelmingly Western bias in the two fields of study. 
One illustration of this from the field of GPE, is provided by Daniel Malniak and Michael 
Tierney (2009) who, in a recent study, singled out the twelve most important journals 
within GPE/IPE in terms of impact. Studying the list, one finds that while all the twelve 
journals are situated within the Anglo-Saxon parts of the Western hemisphere, no fewer 
than nine (75 per cent) of them are based in the USA. As the most read and most cited 
journals within the field, they have significant power in terms of setting the agenda and 
creating an understanding of the ‘reality’ of the subjects dealt with. Awareness of this is 
important as one engages with the readings of these journals, which in a sense act both 
as creators of and the gatekeepers of the ‘truth’ of the G208.   
                                                        
8 Although it embraces a constructivist perspective, this thesis does not believe in the idea of one single 
truth. 
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From the above, one can conclude that an important challenge in any study lies in the 
selection of data. One risks, if one does not remain conscious of the power one wields in 
selecting data and theory drawing too narrow or, worse, uncritical epistemological and 
ontological boundaries of the thesis. In short, it is important to remain conscious of what 
assumptions underlie one’s view of international relations and dynamics in the 
international arena. Such assumptions help determine what the researcher looks for and, 
in turn, what answers a research project provides. 
 
Finally, all research has an ethical-moral dimension. A useful point of departure in 
looking at the concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts that arise over the ‘proper’ way to 
conduct research is the researcher himself. Research is not devoid of values. Both the 
choice of research question and the choice of the manner in which and the perspectives 
from which one approaches that research question is reflective of one’s values and 
background. This has become particularly clear to me as a student of international 
relations, first in Europe, and then in South Africa. For it is less likely that the theoretical 
framework of this thesis would have been as coloured by critical strands of thought had 
the project been undertaken during my studies at the department of political science at 
the University of Oslo – which is an academic institution much closer to the so-called 
American school of thought, or what Cox (1995: 30-32) labels problem-solving theory 
both in thinking of international relations and in thinking of global political economy.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
This study is divided into five chapters. The chapter following this introductory one 
presents the G20 and the historical context within which it developed and exists. It also 
asks what role the group occupies in contemporary global governance.  
 
The third chapter of this study provides a more detailed account of the above-sketched 
selection of analytical tools that together form the analytical approach and theoretical 
basis of the thesis.  
 
Devoted to the task of deconstructing the change related to the G20, the fourth chapter 
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provides the discussion of the study. By using the analytical tools presented in chapter 
three, this penultimate chapter critically examines the changes related to the G20 the 
G20 in three dimensions of global governance; material, institutional and ideational.  
 
The fifth and final chapter of the study concludes the research with a summary of the 
main findings of the present study and identifies some possible areas for future 
research. Drawing from the analytical toolbox of this study the chapter also reflects on 
whether the changes related to the creation of the G20 are of a world order-altering 
nature, or whether they take place within the existing system. 
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2 The G20 in Global Governance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The increase in international organisation since the second half of the twentieth century 
is one of the most striking features of international relations today and raises the 
question of what role international institutions play in contemporary global governance. 
While the nature of the changes represented by the G20 are further examined in the 
fourth and fifth chapter of this study, the aim of the present chapter is to provide some 
understanding of the group itself and some of the main features of the context within 
which it exists. This is achieved through two main sections. The first of the two sketches 
the context within which the G20 finds itself. Here, the concept of ‘global governance’ is 
defined and discussed. The second one turns to the question of what the G20 is, 
accounting for the history and nature of the group. The 2008 global economic crisis – 
which represents something of a crisis for the order global governance creates, is also 
presented.  
 
 
2.2 Context: Understanding Global Governance  
2.2.1 Defining and Studying Global Governance 
Although frequently referred to in both mainstream and academic literature, ‘global 
governance’ is a relatively poorly understood concept. With some significant exceptions 
in the immediate post-Cold War era9, the disciplines of International Relations (IR) 
theory and Global Political Economy (GPE) have largely avoided engaging with the 
phenomenon. Often, global governance is variously treated as a fad or dismissed entirely.  
 
                                                        
9 See for instance Rosenau (1997); Murphy (1994); Cox (1997); Gill (1997); Sewell (2000); Schechter 
(1999a), Schechter (1999b), Sakamoto (1994); Hewson and Sinclair (1999). 
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One might question the rationale for studying the very limited world government that 
has emerged. The world government there is might, after all, be seen as amorphous – 
and, by some, even as morally suspect (Wilkinson and Hughes 2002: 1). Robert Cox 
(1996) sees at its centre a cloud of ideological influence that has fostered the 
realignment of elite thinking to the needs of the world market. As a consequence, much 
scholarship on global governance focuses on the more concrete international regimes, 
the norms, rules and decision-making procedures that states have created to govern 
international life within specific realms. Yet, the case for conducting a more thorough 
and holistic interrogation of contemporary global governance might possibly be found 
precisely in its lack of a clearly defined shape or form.  
 
In 1995 the Commission on Global Governance – an independent group, comprising 
prominent international figures such as then president of Costa Rica, the president of 
the World Bank, and the first executive director of the United Nations Environmental 
Programme – formed to consider what reforms in modes of international cooperation 
were called for by global changes. In their report, they defined governance as “the sum 
of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs”. Furthermore, the Commission saw governance as “… a continuing process 
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative 
action may be taken. [This process] includes formal … as well as informal arrangements 
that people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” 
(Commission for Global Governance 1995:2).  
 
It is premature to speak of the existence of a complete and fully coherent system of 
global governance. Rather, global governance may perhaps be better understood as a 
process, still emerging. According to Ougaard (2004: 5) global politics directs our 
attention to the emergence of a fragile global polity, or to how the global order is or is 
not governed. According to Weiss (Thakur and Weiss 2010) “’Global governance’ – 
which can be good, bad, or indifferent – refers to concrete cooperative problem-solving 
arrangements, many of which increasingly involve not only the United Nations (UN) of 
states but also ‘other UNs’, namely international secretariats and other nonstate actors”. 
Such ‘cooperative problem-solving arrangements’ may be formal, taking the shape of 
laws or formally constituted institutions for a variety of actors (be they state authorities, 
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intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
private sector entities, or other civil society actors and individuals) to manage collective 
affairs (Zaleski 2006). They may also be informal – such as practices or guidelines – or 
ad hoc entities – such as coalitions (Karns and Mingst 2004:5).  
 
While there is relatively broad-based agreement that there is such a thing as an evolving 
global governance complex, a world government has yet to materialise. Governance is 
often associated with governing. However, while the two concepts are clearly related, 
they are not identical. As James Rosenau puts it: 
 
Both refer to purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government 
suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the 
implementation of duly constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by 
shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and 
that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. 
Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces 
governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, nongovernmental mechanisms whereby 
those persons and organisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfil 
their wants (Rosenau 1992:4). 
 
Hence, one should be cautious of thinking of global governance as global government. In 
fact, global governance encompasses the regulation of interdependent relations in the 
absence of an overarching political authority. Hence, rather than a top-down, 
hierarchical structure of authority, global governance is “a collection of governance-
related activities, rules and mechanisms, formal or informal, existing at a variety of 
levels in the world today” (Karns and Mingst 2004: 4)10. Karns and Mingst (ibid.) refer to 
these as the “pieces of global governance”. 
 
This thesis embraces a broad definition of global governance, tentatively understanding 
it as the sum of activities creating the overarching system that regulates human affairs 
on a worldwide basis. Such an understanding lies close to what Cox (1996) refers to as 
the system of ‘world order’. In this world order, the mechanisms and rules of 
governance are created by the actions and agreements of key actors in the global system. 
The ‘systemically important’ members of the G20 provide a good example of such actors, 
                                                        
10 Such a complex view of global governance is, amongst others, shared by Thakur, Ramesh and Thomas G. 
Weiss (2006) who see global governance as a “[…] complex of formal and informal institutions, 
mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, 
both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, 
rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated.” 
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particularly when operating through the G20. For, while the primary actor remains the 
state, a striking feature of global governance in the past fifty years has been the 
increasingly important role played by inter-state organisation in facilitating governance.  
 
2.3 What is the G20? 
The question of the place of the G20 in the system of global governance is integral to the 
overall ambition of this study. However, in order to engage with the question of what 
change in global governance the group represents, it is important to have at least some 
idea of the nature of the group and of where it places itself within that system of 
governance at the outset of the study. The power wielded by the G20 and its potential as 
a vehicle for change is tied up with the question of what the G20 is, practically, politically 
and ideationally. Moreover, the nature of the change the G20 may bring about further 
depends on the nature of the group itself. 
 
2.3.1 Historically: Origins and Evolution – The Road towards G20 Summitry 
The ‘Group of Twenty’ traditionally refers to a group of finance ministers and central 
bank governors from twenty economies – nineteen countries and the European Union. 
Today, the abbreviation also includes the regular activity of the group at a summit-level. 
The immediate precursor to G20 summitry was an informal forum for discussion 
amongst officials from the G7/8 countries and a select group of ‘systemically significant’ 
developing countries in the wake of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. The crisis lead 
American President Bill Clinton and his ranking G7/8 allies to recognise the need to find 
a more effective, inclusive – yet still flexible – forum, at the leaders’ and ministerial level, 
to respond to the challenges imposed by processes of globalisation. Hence, the G20 was 
from the very beginning an attempt to deal with shortcomings in the global governance 
architecture. It has become clear – at least to some – that G7/8 discussions on dealing 
with the global impact of the 1997 Asian Crisis needed to include countries that were 
not part of the informal G7/8 network. The G7/8 finance ministers therefore set up a 
new international forum of finance ministers11 and central bank governors from the 
                                                        
11 or “[…] new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional 
system, to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically 
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twenty economies that were deemed worthy of a place amongst the most systemically 
important economies in the world12. In addition, the Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the President of the World Bank, as well as the 
Chairpersons of the International Monetary and Financial Committee and Development 
Committee of the IMF and World Bank, participate fully in the discussions. Since its 
inception in 1999, there has been a finance ministerial meeting once a year. Moreover 
the heads of states of G20 members meet biannually. Today, the G20 summits of heads 
of state or government are held in addition to the G20 meetings of finance ministers and 
central bank governors, who continue to meet to prepare the summits and implement 
their decisions.  
 
Informal meetings amongst so-called systemically important countries have long been 
an important part of international governance. The agenda of such meetings seems to 
have been closely tied to issues of stability, and it is likely that their decisions have been 
important in maintaining peace and stability at a regional level for quite some time13. It 
is debatable when such meetings began to address problems at a global level but, at the 
least, some sort of world order was provided by the meetings leading to the creation of 
the 1919-1945 League of Nations, followed by the United Nations and the 1947 Atlantic 
family of institutions. The Group of 7 and/or 8 (G7/8) summit later replaced the 
aforementioned bodies, and became the centre of global governance, recurrently 
creating consensus and inducing compliance amongst its members and other states and 
international institutions (Kirton 1995: 64-65). Just as is the case for the G20, G7/8 
summitry takes its origins from events that had a profound effect on the world economic 
system.  
 
2.3.1.1 The 2008 Global Economic Crisis and the Widening of Global Governance  
The current nature and role of the G20 is intimately tied up with crisis in the global 
economy. Indeed, the first convening of the group at a leaders’ level was a direct 
                                                                                                                                                                             
significant economies and to promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world growth that 
benefits all […]” (G7 1999)  
12 These are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and the European Union. 
13 One obvious example is to be found in the Concert of Europe, which helped produce peace amongst the 
great powers, and prosperity more widely from 1818 to 1914.  
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response to the 2008 global economic crisis. Although referring to it as an economic 
crisis, this study does not see the turmoil in the global economy, which began in 
2007/2008, as an economic crisis alone. Rather, it may be seen to represent a systemic 
crisis, in which whatever global governance or global order there was came, and 
remains, under great pressure. The G20 has been key in the efforts to reinvigorate and 
coordinate international cooperation after the series of events that have taken place in 
the world over the last few years. 
 
The effects of the 2008 global economic crisis – first coined as a ‘credit crunch’ – began 
to be felt in the second half of 2007, when banks in several corners of the world 
announced losses linked to US subprime mortgages. The origins of the downturn 
however, may arguably be traced back to the last major financial crisis, which saw the 
birth of the antecedents of the G7/8. The first G7/8 summits addressed the challenges 
that followed from economic shocks of the early 1970s. Most importantly, those 
challenges included the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system of fixed 
exchange rates, and the inability of the Bretton Woods institutions to implement the 
necessary reforms to overcome a series of problems14. As such, one might interpret the 
first steps towards G7/8, and eventually G20, summitry as a recognition that the shifting 
international context had rendered it impossible for “…the traditional organs of 
international co-operation [to] reconcile the differences among the leading Western 
powers or to give them a sense of common purpose …” (Putnam and Bayne 1987: 25-27). 
An informal meeting between the finance ministers of France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States in March 1973 in the White House library is often 
considered to be the very first amongst those steps. This so-called ‘Library Group’ was 
initiated by the United States (US) who, following a devaluation of the US dollar that 
year, invited the finance ministers of the aforementioned countries to meet informally. 
The group is best described as a forum and later became the ‘Group of Five finance 
ministers’ (G5), when joined by Japan (Hajnal 1999: 4).  
                                                        
14 The first oil crisis, caused by an embargo of oil supplies enacted by the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the disagreement of Western 
countries as to how to respond to the crisis and its economic effects is seminal amongst these problems. 
The 1974 economic recession in countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), in which inflation and unemployment rates rose sharply; and, the changes created 
by the first enlargement of the European Community (EC) may also be included in any listing of such 
problems (Hajnal 1999; 2007b). 
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Initially the summits, whose participation would eventually grow from five to seven15 
seem to have been thought of as temporary and case-specific arrangements. When the 
Five, plus Japan, met at Rambouillet, France, in November 1975 all participants 
presented it as a once-off get-together (Dobson 2007: xvi). Nevertheless, US President 
Gerald Ford called another such conference in San Juan, Puerto Rico in June 1976. The 
group continued to grow, and after San Juan the summit became a regular annual event, 
taking place in a strictly determined rotation among the G7 countries: France, the United 
States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada (Hajnal 1999: 
13). The following year, the 1977 London Summit saw the European Community (EC) 
become a participant. Although the EC, both then and today, remains a less-than-equal 
participant, this also meant the end of the summits as an affair strictly between states. 
As such, it adds to the curiosity of the ‘groups’ as institutions.  
 
A series of decisions made by the G7 and the US, which remained very much at the head 
of affairs, in the 1970s and 1980s helped the group end a period that had for many 
states been marked by stagflation16. The long economic upswing that followed the G7’s 
manoeuvres was formidable, and difficult to liken with any other period of growth. 
However, a major global downturn in the early 1990s, and the start of a deep financial 
crisis in Japan, that would considerably hamper the growth of the otherwise formidable 
Japanese economy17, throughout the 1990s tells the story of an economic progress that 
was not uninterrupted. The instabilities culminated in the 1997 Asian crisis that had 
contagious effects not only within Asia, but also on economies in other parts of the 
world18. Yet, although the Asian crisis heavily affected the economies of the Western 
world as well it seems to soon have been regarded as more of an episode than a crisis. 
While the fall in prices of imported goods, and the prospects for overtaking companies at 
bargain prices, might have created the conditions for the perception amongst some in 
the West of the Asian crisis as a passing phenomenon, the single most important factor 
                                                        
15 And then eight, once the very complex process of including Russia succeeded. 
16 The combination of high inflation, high unemployment and slow economic growth. 
17 While much attention is today given to China, Japan was a veritable marvel of economic growth during 
the 1960s and 1970s (Claes, 2006:124). 
18 The last ripples of the crisis left Brazil with little other choice than to devaluate by 35 per cent in 
January 1999, which in turn strained the Argentine economy, forcing the country into a deep economic, 
social and political crisis in the beginning of the twenty-first century (Claes 2006:122-125).  
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in that regard seems to have been the thrill of a ‘new economy’. A new way of thinking 
about economics spread, and information and communication technologies were meant 
to create a permanent increase in production that could make possible rapid growth 
without inflation19. These ideas, which were firmly rooted in neoliberal thought, 
continued to build on the growth model that had underpinned the economic upswing 
that began in the 1980s. The goal of that financial growth model20 had been to expand 
credit and enlist the financial sector as the most important driver of growth and 
competition in the economy (Gamble 2009:14)21. The dominance of finance and the 
financial markets that followed and came to mark the end of the twentieth century was 
seen by observers such as Susan Strange and Andrew Glyn as greater in certain respects 
than at any previous time in the history of capitalism (Gamble, 2009).  
 
Although fears were expressed that the new financial growth model – referred to as 
‘casino capitalism’ by Strange (1986) – was unstable, little was done to correct the 
possible instability of the market. It seems that the willingness for reform was inversely 
proportional to the development of the stock market, and when signs that all was not 
well in the sub-prime market began to multiply in 2007, it was too late. When the G20 
leaders convened in Washington at the end of 2008, the financial crisis that began in the 
US had reached global proportions. It had also spread into other sectors (Gamble 
2009:31). For instance, the effects of the turmoil were severe enough for the 
International Labour Organization (ILO)22 to describe it as a global job crisis. The 
question of whether the crisis also represented a crisis for the current world order will 
be dealt with in the two final chapters of this study. What is clear, however, is that the 
creation of the G20 in response to it represents yet another step towards a furthering of 
global governance that has been taking place for quite some time. 
 
                                                        
19 To a certain extent, the technology bubble of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century 
may have appeared to confirm the ‘new economy’ presumption that a wave of new technology would 
contribute to the creation of new values.  
20 Which based itself on the trinity of tax cuts, privatisation and deregulation (particularly of the financial 
sector). 
21 Amongst the consequences where the rise of investment banks and rating agencies to commanding 
positions in the global economy at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and a rapid increase of new 
financial vehicles and instruments, a readiness by banks to rent money to people based on existing assets 
and income in order for them to be able to invest in other assets which promised a higher return (Gamble, 
2009:15). 
22 Which Robert W. Cox once headed (Leysens 2010: 7) 
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2.3.1.2 A note on the Widening Agenda of the Gs 
It is not only the membership of the Gs that has grown in number. The changes in 
membership have not been nearly as drastic as the changes in the focus of the 
discussions of the Gs. When the Library Group, and later the G5, began to meet regularly, 
the agenda was first and foremost centred on financial and other economic issues 
(Dobson, 2007: 4-7). Later generations of summitry widened their scope to include 
issues related to politics and security, and at the third G7 summit, held in London in May 
1977, the word ‘economic’ was dropped from the title. While the management of various 
macroeconomic issues remained firmly on the agenda, it was only to be expected that 
the political and security tensions marking the context within which the G7 existed 
would impact upon the summit’s discussions and shape its agenda23. After all, the 
agendas of such summits are not conceived in a vacuum. One example of this is found in 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which did not only affect the membership of the G7, 
through the inclusion of Russia, but also its agenda (Dobson 2007: 9-10). The nature of 
G7/8 summitry also underwent considerable alteration as a result of its increasing 
preoccupation with processes of globalisation. New forms of international interaction 
came to occupy, and still occupy, an important role in such summitry. For example, the 
role of ‘civil society’ and NGOs has increased in importance since they were first cited in 
summit documentation after the 1994 Naples Summit (Dobson, 2007:10). Moreover, 
Hajnal (1999: 5) suggests that the background of some of the representatives 
participating at the summits may also, in part, explain this shift in attention. While 
seminal figures in early summitry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt were both 
former financial ministers who understood financial and other economic issues well and 
were eager to discuss such issues with their opposite numbers from other major 
industrialised countries, the subsequent generations of G7/8 leaders did not share this 
background, and were therefore more inclined to broaden the scope of their discussions 
to political and other non-economic topics. With the recent financial turmoil and the 
2008 global economic crisis the leaders’ concentration on economic issues is on the rise 
again, in significant collaboration with their finance ministers.  
 
                                                        
23 Most notably amongst such tensions was the stationing of missiles in Europe by both the US and the 
USSR and a number of connected and unconnected regional disputes, such as the Argentine invasion of the 
Falkland Islands, the situation in the Middle East and the first Gulf war. 
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2.3.2 The G20 as an International Institution 
Practically 
In its present form, the G20 presents a quandary. While the Gs are often referred to and 
studied as international institutions, it is clear that the G20 and its predecessors – 
G5/6/7/8 – are rather unorthodox international institutions24. The G20 is a curiosity 
amongst global institutions. It does not, neither at a ministerial level, nor at a leaders’ 
level, have the trappings normally associated with an intergovernmental body and is 
neither an international organisation nor a global institution in the traditional sense.  
 
To place the G20 and its precursors in context it might be useful to recall that the 
authoritative Yearbook of International Organizations defines IGOs as bodies that are 
“based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation states; 
… includ[e] three or more nation states as parties to the agreement; …[and have] a 
permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks” (Yearbook of International 
Organizations 1993: 1649). Although members such as France, China and Brazil have 
supported the acquisition of such features, the group has no permanent address, staff or 
secretariat (Guebert 2010: 26). The chairmanship, along with an obligation to host an 
annual meeting and provide a secretariat, rotates annually amongst the members. The 
group has no formal rules of membership, no formal authority to make rules, and no 
formal process for decision-making or resolving disputes25. These attributes, which are 
equally descriptive of the G7/8, help to clarify what the G20 does and does not do. The 
structure of the group means that it is not a formal international organisation to which 
states have delegated – or even can delegate – power. Rather, the group seems to be 
better described as a potential forum26 for agenda-setting, policy coordination and 
distribution of tasks across existing institutions, and building consensus around norms 
and knowledge.  
                                                        
24 See Bayne (1995: 83-84) for a further discussion of the challenges related to defining the G7/8 and its 
predecessors as an institution 
25 Organisations have clear organisational centres and a formal, material, structure, which – as Michael 
Hodges (1999: 69) puts it – “…in practice are often their cafeterias and pension plans”. The lack of an 
official Internet page is another proof that the G20 is no ordinary institution. Although G7/8 countries, 
and the host countries in particular, may have such pages, neither the G7/8 nor the G20 as such have 
websites. 
26 The G20 itself also uses the term to define its character: “The G20 is the premier forum for our 
international economic development…” (G20 2011b) 
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While the G20 is not an organisation, it is an institution. After all, it brings together the 
leadership of twenty economies, and embodies both annual summits and a proliferation 
of other meetings, ministerial or official, regular or occasional, avowed or unpublicised. 
As an international institution, the G20 is amongst what Karns and Mingst (2004) have 
described as ‘pieces of global governance’, or cooperative problem-solving 
arrangements and activities that states and other actors have put into place in order to 
deal with various issues and problems. For the purposes of this thesis, ‘international 
institutions’ are understood in a broad sense to comprise various formal and informal 
entities. In many cases, international public authority is vested in an institution that 
qualifies as an international organisation with international legal personality. However, 
studying the G20 and its role in global governance it becomes clear that entities other 
than international organisations may also exercise public authority. Some treaty 
regimes or informal institutions, such as the G20, are creatures of states that wield 
considerable political clout and whose acts raise concerns of legitimacy. Bogdandy et al. 
(2010: 15-16) points out that although such bodies may not have legal personality akin 
to an international organisation, they may be regarded as institutions in the sense of 
organisational sociology. Moreover, they argue that even in policy areas where a 
competent formal organisation does exist, public authority may be exercised through 
more or less informal bodies associated with that organisation such as networks of 
domestic administrators. Given the empirical insight that many of the more informal and 
more difficult to characterise organisations operate largely as the less legalised brethren 
of formal organisations, such a broad conceptualisation of international institutions is 
useful for the purposes of this study. 
 
Paraphrasing Hodges (ibid.) characterising the G7/8, one might describe the G20 as an 
international club trying to raise consciousness, create networks and set an agenda, 
working through other institutions and, in some cases, facilitating the creation of 
institutions suited to a particular task. As such, the G20 may perhaps best be described 
as a forum. Labelling the group as a forum does not reduce its importance. On the 
contrary, the G20’s role as a promoter of dialogue amongst the most powerful states on 
some of the most pressing global issues gives it a significance that few others can boast. 
However, in order for it to succeed in that regard, the G20 needs legitimacy.  
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Politically 
While the G20 is a more representative body than the G7/8, its legitimacy is highly 
contested. Important representatives of the South, such as the Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Aboul Gheit, have voiced concerns that the G20 runs the risk of becoming a 
closed club. It is not only the global South which is frustrated by lack of representation 
in the G20. Shorr claims that the G20 is the first organisation created with the backing of 
the United States that divides the world into countries that matter and those that do not 
(Shorr and Wright 2010: 182). While one might disagree with such a claim27, the 
seemingly arbitrary membership of the group does provide a basis for criticism. It is not 
simply the world’s twenty largest economies that have been given a place around the 
table.  Rather, the selection of G20 members seems to have an intrinsically political 
dimension to it. It is no coincidence, for example, that post-crisis growth marvel Taiwan 
(BBC 2011b) has not been found worthy of a seat in a group in which China is a 
prominent figure.  
 
The G20 has, at a ministerial level, long remained considerably more closed to non-
members than the G7/8 was (Kirton, 2005). Moreover, while the inclusiveness of the 
G20 at a leaders’ level has undoubtedly been better than the G7/8’s before it, less 
powerful, low-income countries remain under-represented. G20 membership still needs 
rethinking in order to become more legitimate in the eyes of the non-represented. This 
is particularly true if the G20 is to move towards a further widening of its agenda 
beyond purely financial matters. In meeting the critique of G20 membership President 
Obama has pointed out that putting together a group of global governance, while at the 
same time pleasing everyone, is challenging: “Everybody wants the smallest possible 
group that includes them. So, if they're the 21st largest nation in the world, they want the 
G21, and think it's highly unfair if they have been cut out” (Chernekoff, 2009). The fact is, 
however, that while number twenty-one might have been left out, the twenty-third, 
thirtieth, and thirty-second largest economies in the world have not. Meanwhile, 
sizeable economies such as that of Spain (twelfth), Netherlands (sixteenth), Switzerland 
(nineteenth) and Poland (twentieth) are not formal members other than through the 
                                                        
27 First on the basis of an objection to the G20 being referred to as an organisation and secondly to the 
idea that previous Gs initiated by the US, such as the G7 and 8, do not share similar qualities in defining 
which states matter and which do not. 
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European Union28. The challenges related to lack of objective criteria for membership in 
the G20 do not become any less if one ventures outside GDP to the area of security. This 
is likely to raise problems as the agenda of the group expands. 
 
The observation that there is politics in the determination of the membership of a group 
of global governance is hardly a groundbreaking one. Yet, scholars in the field of G20-
studies seldom point to it. Rather, the membership of the G20 seems to be described as 
‘arbitrary’. Moreover, the observation is given some space because the discontent with 
the membership of the G20 appears to be greater amongst those left out than was the 
case with the G7/8. In widening the circle of those given a key place in global 
governance the marginalisation of those left out has increased. Representing the left-out 
northern countries of Europe, Norwegian foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, has 
described the G20 as “… the biggest setback in decades”, referring to the fact that none 
of the economies from the northern hemisphere have been found worthy of a spot (Der 
Spiegel, 2010). While Støre’s contention that the group represents the biggest setback in 
decades is debatable, it is interesting that the G20 does in fact mirror a reality nearly one 
and a half decades old: a carbon copy of the G20 format adopted in the wake of the Asia 
crisis, the G20 members have not earned their individual membership due to their 
current position in the global system. Rather, the composition of the G20 brings together 
the countries which held the key to the solution of the governance challenges of the mid-
1990s.  
 
Although it does not fully explain it, this time-leap may in part account for the 
considerable regional imbalance in the G20. Europe, in addition to the big four 
established members of the G7/8 – the UK, France, Germany and Italy – have seen the 
European Commission president gain entry to the G20. Africa – which is the continent 
containing a bigger number of states than any other continent – on the other hand, is 
represented only by South Africa. The regional imbalances are only reinforced by the 
fact that all three North American Free Trade Agreement countries as well as two 
central Southern Common Market countries are included in the G20, while no Caribbean 
country has yet been found worthy of a place at the ‘high table’. It could be added, 
however, that one might question whether the G20 really is a group of twenty. Thus far, 
                                                        
28 Measured in GDP. Numbers from the World Bank (2011) 
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the group has traditionally invited both additional states and organisations to their 
summits. Moreover, Spain tends to show up regardless of the fact that it is not formally 
invited to participate in the G20 process (Shorr and Wright 2010: 184). 
 
2.3.3 The Evolution of the G20 from Crisis Buster towards a Permanent Forum 
The G20, both at a ministerial and at a leaders’ level, may be seen as a product of a 
growing debate on new forms of governance. The series of financial crises at the end of 
the twentieth century led some to question the stability of the global financial system. In 
face of the contagious effects of these crises much effort has been devoted to examining 
various models for a ‘new financial architecture’ (O’Brien and Williams, 2007: 235). The 
2008 global economic crisis has not dampened such efforts.  
 
The founding of the G20 at a ministerial level may be regarded as an attempt of 
institutional innovation emerging from the many attempts to reform the international 
mechanisms regulating the financial market. While the G7 finance ministers’ group has 
since 1986 proven to be an effective forum for informal and substantive discussion of 
important international economic issues, the lack of emerging market representation in 
the G7/8 limits its ability to deal with some issues related to developments in the 
international economy and financial system (G20 Research Group, 2000). In today’s 
economy, broad representation in policy discussions is crucial. Moreover, the Asian 
financial crisis demonstrated that financial markets in developed countries can be 
seriously affected by financial instability in emerging markets. The 2008 global 
economic crisis has underlined that fact. In the last years before the G20 finance 
ministers first convened, ad hoc groups known as the G22 and the G33 were created to 
help address specific issues related to the Asian financial crisis. The useful suggestions 
for enhancing global economic security that emanated from the G22 and G33 processes 
demonstrated the need for a regular international consultative forum with a broader 
membership than the G20 (G20 Research Group, 2000). The creation of the G20 finance 
ministers’ meetings arguably represented a next stage in the evolution of informal 
consultation amongst industrialised countries. Whereas the G7/8 essentially gathers the 
most economically developed states and Russia, the G20 includes several of the largest 
developing states, such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia. Hence, while the G7/8 has 
long been accused of being a rich man’s club, the G20 has – in the eyes of some – the 
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potential to bolster legitimacy of financial reforms by having a broader base of countries 
participate in decision-making.  
 
The mandate of the G20 finance ministers’ group has largely been limited to the 
promotion of discussion, studying and reviewing policy issues among industrialised 
countries and emerging markets with a view to promoting international financial 
stability. Both the G20 at a finance minister’s level and at a summit level is intimately 
focused on the maintenance of financial stability. The first G20 summit, in Washington, 
was officially named the “Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy” (Kirton 
and Guebert, 2009: 6). The name accurately indicates both what would occupy most of 
the summit’s agenda and what the main bulk of economists and political scientists 
suggested the leaders should discuss (see for instance Eichengreen and Baldwin, 2008; 
Brookings Institution, 2008; Kirton, 2008; Rotman School of Management, 2008). While 
financial stability still remains at the heart of the summit’s preoccupation, there have 
been some competing conceptions about what the mandate of the summit should be. 
Some have suggested that the group should widen the scope of their discussions. While 
G20 summitry was still being discussed, Paul James (2004) suggested that the G20 as a 
summit process should be considered. That is, as an interconnected series of agenda-
based meetings in which heads of member states either come themselves or delegate 
participation to the most relevant government ministers and advisors, as well as invite 
relevant stakeholders.  
 
It could be imagined that the life-cycle of the G20 at the finance ministers’ level might 
suggest a possible trajectory for the G20 at a leaders’ level, which saw its influence 
decline after the group’s crisis-based agenda became less pressing (Martinez-Diaz and 
Woods, 2009; Woods, 2010b). The G20, both at a finance ministers’ and at a leaders’ 
level, was initiated as part of crisis management at the global governance level.  We do 
not see any sign that the G20 is likely to wither away even as the immediacy of the 2008 
economic crisis has subsided. Still, it remains an open question what implications the 
creation of the G20 is likely to have on global governance. The penultimate chapter of 
this study examines the global change that the G20 has brought – and is likely to bring – 
about in global governance. The following chapter presents a selection of analytical tools 
that might prove useful to that task. 
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 3 Analytical Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Albert Einstein once told Werner Heisenberg, one of the founding fathers of quantum 
mechanics, that “…theory decides what one can observe” (Heisenberg, 1969: 91-92). 
This places great importance on the choice of theory and the manner in which such 
theory is used. It also means that combining theories with each other in new ways opens 
opportunities for new observations.  
 
The metatheoretical base of this study is found within the critical tradition. Two 
principles guide the selection of analytical tools in this study. First, they must facilitate 
the exploration and critical discussion of the narratives and material and institutional 
changes surrounding the G20. Secondly, they must enrich the study of the elements of 
those changes once they have been deconstructed. Specifically, the theory of Robert Cox 
is integral to the critical tradition this study works within to examine some important 
traits of the changes related to the establishment of the Group of 20. Combining 
eclecticism and rigour, Cox has opened up new landscapes in the study of global 
governance through merging theories and applying analytical tools from several fields of 
study. This research endeavour draws from a selection of the analytical tools Cox uses, 
and remains firmly grounded within the theoretical framework of Robert Cox. At the 
same time the study borrows from some of the insights constructivist thought provides. 
Constructivism is analytically open and problematises both agents and structures, calls 
into question established understandings of world politics, and explores both change 
and stasis. As such, it is critical much in the sense Habermas and Cox use the term (Price 
and Smith 1998: 259). Constructivist and Coxian Critical Theory are fundamentally 
holistic in their approach to change and are therefore well suited to approach change 
within the global governance structure. It is hoped that the tools found within 
constructivism, together with the theory of Cox, will facilitate the aim of examining the 
changes in global governance related to the G20. In analysing that change, this study 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  30 
embraces Cox’s near organic understanding of systemic change, and his emphasis on the 
need for deconstruction of such change in order to better understand it as a whole. The 
global governance structure cannot readily be deconstructed to its individual units and 
their interactions; structures are more than the sum of their parts and are irreducibly 
social.  
 
It is important that one approaches change in the international system with a 
combination of perspectives. Methodologically, critical theorists reject the hegemony of 
a single scientiﬁc method, and advocate a plurality of approaches to the generation of 
knowledge. Yet, an important caveat of which one needs to be aware when one 
approaches a problem using several theories at once is that of incommensurability. The 
theories used in this study cannot readily be compared so as to determine which is the 
more accurate, nor can it be determined which of the theories provide the best 
description of a phenomenon. However, the aim of this study is not so much to provide a 
definite answer to the change happening in global governance as it is to provide some 
possible ways in which one might label those changes. Precisely because of 
incommensurability one might, as Feyerabend (1999) does, question whether the 
process of scientific change can at all be explained in its totality in the light of some 
rationality. Rather than seeking the ‘truth’ of what is happening, the aim of this study is 
to provide a description of several ways in which the changes in global governance 
following from the G20 may be understood, and to provide a knowledgeable 
interpretation of those changes, through the use of the set of analytical tools outlined in 
the following.  
 
The 2008 global economic crisis created a renewed interest in ‘change’ in the global 
arena. However, the writings following from this interest reveal shortcomings in the 
ability of much IR- and GPE-theory to account for change. While it is not the aim of the 
following chapter to suggest how such ‘holes’ may be patched, this has implications for 
the thesis’ use of theory. Most importantly the theory guiding the analysis of this thesis 
may be regarded more as approaches from a toolbox than as an all-encompassing 
theoretical framework.  
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Theories may be seen as simplifying devices, allowing us to decide which facts matter 
and which do not. Baylis and Smith (2006: 3) propose sunglasses with different 
coloured lenses as an analogy to describe the effect of theories. This is not to say that all 
theories are equally useful or important. The epistemic and ontological differences 
between theories may produce very different accounts of the same phenomenon 
depending on what theory one uses. While it is true that the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each theory may vary, depending on the case, the analytical clarity 
provided by such explanations varies.  
 
The analytical tools of this study are drawn from more critical strands of GPE and IR 
theory. In order to study a world order phenomenon, such as the 2008 global economic 
crisis, it is important to be able not only to study the elements within this order, but also 
the order itself. This thesis builds on the assumption that a critical approach is helpful in 
achieving the critical distance to the global governance structures required to study 
them. Consequently, questions such as ‘how did they come about?’ and ‘who do they 
benefit?’ are important guides in the exploration of what change the G20 embodies and 
constitutes. Moreover, it is in the spirit of critical theory that this thesis draws on 
constructivism, in particularly the more critical oriented strands within it, in an attempt 
to shed some new light on the complex issue of change in global governance. The 
following few paragraphs briefly, and in a more general manner, touch on a selection of 
Cox’s thinking that is particularly relevant to this study. Some space is then devoted in 
the subsequent sections of this chapter to a more specific presentation of the most used 
analytical tools in this study. 
 
3.2 Robert Cox, the Analysis of World Order, and the Study of Change through the 
Lense of Historical Materialism  
Loner, fugitive, eccentric, guru, neo-Gramscian, Marxist, Weberian and reductionist. The 
attempts to apply a label to the historian and political economist Robert W. Cox are 
many and, more often than not, flawed. His theoretical approach has been interpreted in 
numerous – and often quite differing – ways. Hence, any approach to his work requires a 
certain degree of humility. It would appear that the development of Cox’s theory may be 
understood within a wider framework based on the dominance of existing theories 
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within IR and GPE, and events taking place in the ‘real’ world. However, although it may 
be true that his theory falls within a critical strand of thinking, it seems inaccurate to 
reduce the development of this theory to a critique of the existing theories. Rather, the 
aim of Cox’s theory seems to be to provide an analytical framework through which we 
may study and give meaning to events taking place in the ‘real’ world. 
 
Cox’s claim that “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1981:128) 
provides a common starting point for explorations of his theory. Expressing a worldview 
related to Gramsci’s work, the quote suggests that knowledge can be neither objective 
nor timeless in the sense that much theory within IR and GPE/IPE implicitly assumes. 
One implication following from this is that there can be no separation between facts and 
values. Whether consciously or not, theorists inevitably bring their values and the 
context within which they live to bear on their research. As a consequence, Cox suggests, 
one needs to look closely at those theories that claim to be value free and ask who or 
what they are for, and what purpose they serve. With that in mind Cox subjects existing 
theory, and particularly the dominant strand of thought during the Cold War – 
neorealism, to a thorough critique. According to him, such theories are for, or serve the 
interests of, those who prosper under the prevailing order – that is the inhabitants of the 
developed states, and in particular the ruling elites. Whether consciously or not, such 
theories reinforce and legitimate the status quo by making the current configuration of 
international relations appear natural and immutable. When neorealists claim to be 
describing the world as it is, as it has been and as it always will be, what they are in fact 
doing is to reinforce the ruling hegemony in the current world order (Hobden and Jones 
2005:237). Rather than preoccupying himself with a problem-solving maintenance of 
social and power relationships – endorsing a static understanding of politics, an abstract 
ahistorical conception of the state and an appeal to universal validity – Cox takes a more 
critical approach to the existing order and power relationships in the world, drawing the 
shape of the prevailing world order into question by seeking out and analysing its 
origins, the historical context within which it exists and whether it might be in a process 
of change (Cox 1981:88-94).  
 
In his monumental work Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making 
of History (1987) Cox approaches the understanding of current historical change from 
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the standpoint of a reciprocal relationship between power and production. As such, his 
thought bears some similarity to Marxist thought, which looks for the causes of societal 
development and change in the collective ways humans use to make the means for living, 
through an economic interpretation of history. The social features of a society derive 
from economic activity. With changes in the economic base of a society comes the 
transformation of the superstructure, or political and legal institutions, of that society; 
this superstructure has a dialectic relationship with the base. This attention given to the 
relationship between the economic and the institutional realm of a society is important 
to the analysis of this study, as it provides a useful tool for studying the changes related 
to the G20 and the consequences those changes might have. Cox claims that “production 
creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human 
efforts are combined in production processes affect all other aspects of social life” (Cox 
1987). The concept of ‘production’ refers to a process rather than to a set of existing 
things, i.e. products, includes the production of institutions, law, morality and ideas (Cox 
1987), and generates the capacity to exercise power. By referring to a process, rather 
than a product, Cox adopts a dynamic and organic understanding of the world, where 
dimensions are interconnected. For instance, power also determines the manner in 
which production takes place (Cox 1987:1). In other words, while the ability to produce 
things generates resources and objects that may be used to influence events, the 
production of things also takes place under a shadow of coercion. A good example might 
be found in the industrial revolution that boosted British productivity and allowed it to 
exercise an international role in the nineteenth century. The organisation of such 
production, however, was accomplished by use of force, whether it was in the case of 
slavery or by forcing people out of the countryside and into factories in Britain (O’Brien 
and Williams 2007:31). 
 
Very broadly speaking, Cox (1981) may be argued to outline some basic premises of 
critical theory that are particularly relevant for the purposes of the present paper. His 
contention that a salient feature of critical thought is that it conceives of all action as 
taking place within a framework is to be found amongst these premises. Hence, rather 
than focus exclusively upon the actors and their interaction within a system, one must 
also examine the framework and changes in that framework itself. A framework has the 
form of a historical structure, understood as “a particular combination of thought 
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patterns, material conditions and human institutions, which has a certain coherence 
among its elements”. More precisely, one might say that a historical structure is an ideal-
type of such a fit – Cox emphasises that any ‘picture’ of a historical structure is 
principally an analytical device (1981: 135-8). At its most abstract such a framework 
may be understood as the reflection of a particular configuration of forces. Although this 
configuration does not determine actions in any direct mechanical way it does impose 
pressures and constraints on the individuals, groups and states existing within them. To 
the extent such actors resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their actions 
with an alternative configuration of forces, or a rival structure (Cox 1981:98). 
 
Whereas some accounts of structure, according to Cox29, permit little scope for agency, 
he presents a fundamentally antireductionist account of structure. For him, structure is 
one moment in a continual process of structural change, orchestrated by human beings. 
The point of studying structure is twofold, in that one seeks both an answer to where 
that structure might have come from, and knowledge of how it may be transformed 
(1981: 135).  
 
Three categories of forces interact within the structure: material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions. Material capabilities have both productive and destructive potentials, 
existing in their dynamic form as technological and organisational capabilities, and in 
their accumulated forms as natural resources which technology can transform, stocks of 
equipment and the wealth that can command these. Ideas, on the other hand, may 
broadly be distinguished into two kinds. Where the one is concerned with historically 
conditioned, broadly commonly held, intersubjective meanings – which may be 
described as shared notions of the nature of social relations – the other kind of ideas 
relevant to historical structure are collective images of social order held by different 
groups of people, and may provide differing views of the nature and the legitimacy of 
prevailing power relations, and of what is good and natural. As the differentiation 
between the two types of ideas suggests, the former set of ideas – the intersubjective 
understandings – are ideas broadly shared by the subjects within a particular historical 
structure and constitute common ground of social discourse, while the latter kind of 
                                                        
29 Cox refers explicitly to neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz as well as Marxists such as Louis Althusser 
and Immanuel Wallerstein (Berry 2007) 
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ideas – the collective understandings – may be several and opposed. Noteworthy in this 
regard is that opposing collective images of social order disclose the potential for 
alternative paths of development and “raises questions as to the possible material and 
institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure” (Cox 1981:99). 
Moreover, Cox argues that a disjuncture between those two forms of ideational 
phenomena is an important source of structural change (ibid.: 138). Finally, institutions 
may be regarded as a way to stabilise and perpetuate a particular world order. 
Reflecting a certain configuration of the prevailing power relations, institutions are 
particular constellations of ideas and material power which in turn influence the 
development of ideas and material power capabilities (Cox 1981:99). 
 
In short, the method of historical structures emphasises the need to operate with limited 
totalities. A historical structure does not represent the world as a whole, but rather as “a 
particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality” (Cox 1981:100). 
Although the notion of a historical structure – as previously defined in this essay – 
represents a sophistication of mainstream approaches to reality, they do provide 
simplified representations of complex realities. Furthermore, they may be seen as 
expressions of tendencies limited in their applicability in time and space, rather than 
fully realised developments (Cox 1981:100). Cox applies the method of historical 
structures to three spheres of activity:  
 
“(1) organisation of production, more particularly with regard to the social forces engendered by the 
production process; (2) forms of state as derived from a study of state/society complexes; and (3) 
world orders, that is, the particular configurations of forces which successively define the problematic 
of war or peace for the ensemble of states. Each of these levels can be studied as a succession of 
dominant and emergent rival structures.” (Cox 1981:100) 
 
Considered separately, each of these spheres of activity may be represented as 
particular configurations of the three categories of forces previously presented. They do 
also, however, exist in a reciprocal relationship to each other “containing as well as 
bearing the impact of, the others” (Cox 1981:101). 
 
Cox’s theoretical work is often referred to as having a normative and emancipatory 
purpose. However, more than challenging the existing world order, Cox’s approach may 
be understood as raising awareness of the nature of the constructs we study. Rejecting 
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monocausal, unidirectional and perhaps most important one-dimensional explanations, 
Cox’s emphasis seems to lie in emphasising the need for a holistic and complex approach. 
Actions and events take place within frameworks whose configuration and 
reconfiguration must be studied. Cox’s approach is therefore multidimensional and 
multifaceted. His critique of so-called ‘explanatory’ studies is not based primarily on the 
observation that they lack a normative dimension, but in that they lack awareness of the 
context they study, as well as the context within which they themselves exist. A critical 
approach is not necessarily normative. Labels such as ‘normative’ easily acquire a 
patronising ring when they are applied within the scholarly community. Rather, with his 
critical approach, Cox calls attention to the nature of the relationship between concepts, 
such as production and power, and to questions such as ‘who benefits?’, ‘who governs?’, 
and ‘for whom?’. 
 
3.3 The Significance of Institutions: A Marxist View 
Amongst the more prominent strands of thought inspiring Coxian Critical Theory we 
find variants of Marxist theory. Uniting these is a set of core ideas, including a grounding 
in historical analysis, the primacy of economic forces in explaining political and social 
phenomena, the central role of the production process, the particular character of 
capitalism as a global mode of production, and the importance of social or economic 
class in defining actors (Karns and Mingst 2004: 52-53). Cox has long conceived of the 
concept of class as the most important source of political identity (Cox 2002). Drawing 
on the Marxist idea of inevitable class struggle, eventually creating a new social order, 
Cox (1986: 220) notes that “[c]hanges in the organization of production generate new 
social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states and … alters 
the problematic of world order”. 
 
Recent theoretical embodiments of Marxist theory extrapolate the systemic focus of 
Marxist thought to the study of international relations. Marxist views on the structure of 
the global system and, hence, on global governance, are rooted in ideas about the 
relationships of class, the capitalist mode of production and power, as outlined above. As 
such, the hierarchical structure of the international community may be regarded as a by-
product of the spread of global capitalism, which privileges some states, organisations, 
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groups, and individuals, and imposes significant constraints on others. Developed 
countries have expanded economically and politically, enabling them to sell goods and 
export surplus wealth that they could not absorb at home. Meanwhile, developing 
countries have become increasingly constrained and dependent on the actions of 
developed countries (Karns and Mingst 2004: 5). This has important bearings on neo-
Marxist understandings of hegemony. Important to neo-Marxist theorising about 
contemporary global governance and on the nature of international institutions is its 
emphasis on the role of ‘globalising elites’ in restructuring the global political economy. 
Such elites are amongst others found in the key financial institutions (IMF, WTO and the 
World Bank), as well as in the finance ministries of G7 countries, making global 
governance “…a predictable institutional response not to the interest of a fully formed 
class, but to the overall logic of industrial capitalism” (Murphy 2000: 799). International 
organisations and institutions are products of a dominant group of states, dominant 
ideas, and the interests of the capitalist class. Some go so far as to view them as 
instruments of capitalist domination, imposed on others. Integral to the theoretical 
framework of this thesis is the thought of Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox. The 
Gramscian view sees international organisations as a means to get others to consent to 
domination through shared ideas. According to Cox (1992b) they are concerned with 
longer-term questions of global structural change and how international organisations 
can help shape change in a consequentially desirable direction. 
 
3.4 Ideas matter: Cox and the Gramscian Notion of Hegemony 
Cox’s article ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory’ represents somewhat of a revival of a Gramscian perspective. Although the 
promise of a Coxian approach is not bound up with the fate of neo-Gramscian GPE, Cox, 
in much of his later work, showed how Gramsci's thought can be used to analyse the 
power structures of the global political economy. In particular, Gramsci’s conception of 
hegemony provides us with useful analytical insight.  
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Whereas hegemony as a term has traditionally been used in IR and GPE to denote the 
supremacy of one major state power30 over others, and perhaps the acceptance of that 
supremacy by the others, a subtler meaning is derived from Gramsci’s thinking, which 
brings culture and ideas alongside material force into the equation. Cox (1981: 104) 
does not share the classic realist view of hegemony as dependent on material 
capabilities, but rather as a fit between material capabilities, ideas and institutions. The 
neo-Gramscian view of hegemony is distinct from that held by realists. To Gramsci, 
hegemony is a relationship between classes in which a dominant class presents its 
interests as the interests of all. A class is considered hegemonic if it has succeeded in 
legitimizing its dominance through concessions and institutions, as well as in the formal 
political structure of the state (Cohen 2005: 131). When a class has established such 
dominance, it constitutes a historic bloc – a dominant configuration of material 
capabilities, ideologies and institutions as a determining frame for individual and 
collective action (ibid.). Hegemony in this Gramscian sense means that the great mass of 
mankind in a particular area or part of the world regard the existing structure of power 
and authority as established, natural and legitimate. Hegemony is expanded when other 
people come to accept those conditions as natural. Hegemony is weakened and eroded 
when the legitimacy of the power structure is called into question and an alternative 
order seems possible and desirable. 
 
Inspired by the Gramscian notion of hegemony, Cox (1983: 127) underlines that internal 
and international hegemony alike are based on both coercion and consent. Hegemony 
reflects an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas 
and supported by material conditions. With the faltering of such consent follows the 
demise of the hegemony it supports, as hegemony can only prevail as long as the 
consensual aspect is in the forefront (ibid.). Secretary of the Nobel Peace Prize 
Committee, historian Geir Lundestad, embraces a similar view in his seminal article 
‘Empire by Invitation’ (1986), where he proposes that the strength of the American 
hegemony may not be explained in terms of the capabilities of the US to project ideas 
and assert its dominance alone. In addition, consent of the ruled is necessary in order to 
account for US hegemony. In the politically and economically unstable reality in the 
                                                        
30 It is discussed whether the ruler, or hegemon, must be a single state. See Krasner (1976) for the main 
arguments of this discussion. 
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immediate aftermath of the Second World War, European states in particular found it 
beneficial to have one state that was strong enough to wield hegemonic power, and 
which could therefore also facilitate the provision of common goods for all states in the 
system. 
 
Observing contemporary international relations through neo-Gramscian lenses, one 
might conclude that the global arena is today marked by a neoliberal transnational 
historic bloc31. When the foundation of such a bloc is shaken, as it may be seen to have 
been by the 2008 global economic crisis, one possible reaction is the emergence of 
counter-hegemonic streams of thought. Such alternative normative interpretations of 
the functioning of economic, social, and political institutions, which challenge the 
dominant configuration of forces may subsume and replace the historic bloc they are 
born in, if they are large enough. Gramsci draws on Machiavellian terminology in order 
to explain how this might happen, as he suggests that it may take place either through a 
war of position or a war of movement. In a war of position counter-hegemonic 
movements seek to increase the number of people who share its view on the hegemonic 
order, thereby transforming the framework of culture and social institutions in order to 
provide the foundation for deep and lasting social change. German student movement 
leader Rudi Dutschke refers to a war of position as a “…long march through the 
institutions” – a formulation later ubiquitously attributed to Gramsci (Buttigieg 2005: 
50). A war of movement, on the other hand, involves physically overwhelming the 
apparatus of the ruling elite – in other words the counter-hegemonic tendencies have 
grown large enough to overthrow the current hegemony and establish themselves as a 
new historic bloc. 
 
As mentioned, the critical theory of Cox draws attention to configurations of material 
capabilities, ideologies and institutions, and how these determine frames for individual 
and collective action. The origin, nature and development of historical blocs and 
structures needs to be studied. States and the realm within which they exist are not 
objects that are known without use of the senses, but phenomena that are subject to 
                                                        
31 Stephen Gill argues that the elite Trilateral Commission has had an important role in shaping the 
hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus (Gill 2003) 
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interpretation – and as such are given reality by the observer. Cox’s ‘historical structures’ 
approach is also fundamentally concerned with ideational phenomena. In particular, 
Cox’s assertion that ideas are not determined by material conditions and institutions, 
but have bi-directional relationships with both is important.  
3.4.1 The Importance of Studying  ‘Minds’ in the study of Change 
Both Cox’s and Gramsci’s methodologies provide for the mutual influence of ideational 
and material factors (Cox 1996: 132). For Cox, the thoughts of Marx and eighteenth 
century philosopher Giambattista Vico are important in this regard (1981: 132-3). While 
the ideas of the former have, to some extent, already been presented in this chapter, 
Vico’s concept of mind is both central to understanding the ontological foundations of 
Cox’s historical structure approach (Berry 2007: 16) and integral to the analytical 
framework of this study. ‘Mind’, for Vico, refers to the thoughts and ideas of human 
beings and is an assertion that ideas matter (Cox 2002: 86-90). Vico stresses that 
people’s ideas are developed in the process of becoming aware of their material 
existence. While Vico believed that structures and institutions are a product of human 
action, he also believed that one needs to understand changes in ‘mind’ – that is, in 
people’s understandings of and attitude towards their environment – if one wishes to 
understand structural and institutional change (Berry 2007: 16). A change in material 
conditions is not alone sufficient to create a response. Hence, in order to fully 
understand the impact of the creation of the G20 it is important to not only study how 
the material shift provoking the creation is likely to affect global governance in material 
terms, but also to imagine how the G20 is likely to affect their assumptive worlds. In so 
doing, it is important to imagine the mental processes of actors, or – so to speak – to 
reconstruct their assumptive worlds. The constructivist toolbox offers some important 
insight in this regard. Although the ideational dimension in Cox’s work is both nuanced 
and well conceptualised, Cox tends to ‘under-examine’ ideas and favour the material and 
institutional aspects of his triad of ideas, material capabilities and institutions 
(Schechter 2002: 3-4). To some extent Cox neglects the dynamics related to the 
construction of ideas, their implementation and their maintenance (Leysens 2010: 8). 
This study does not hold any lofty ambition of expanding on Cox’s framework. It does, 
however, hope to show that the tools provided by critical constructivism are useful in 
the exploration of the ideational dimension of the changes related to the G20. 
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3.5 Ideas matter: Some Useful Perspectives from the Constructivist toolbox 
The Coxian method historicism stresses the importance of ideational change for 
transformation (Leysens 2010: 6). The contribution of constructivists, such as 
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) have been important in directing the attention of GPE 
towards an understanding which stresses the inseparability of change in the material 
and ideational worlds. Some of the tools within constructivist thought prove useful for 
the analysis of this study. 
 
Constructivism’s antecedents are located in the 1980s and in a series of critical reactions 
to the mainstream IR-theories of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism (Barnett 
2006: 251). Inspired by, amongst others, sociologists and psychologists, some scholars 
began to question the preoccupation by realist and liberalist tradition with the material 
aspects of the international system. Social constructivists do not reject the importance of 
‘brute facts’ to the dynamics of international politics. They do, however, stress the 
significance of deconstructing ‘social facts’ in order to fully comprehend international 
relations (Jackson and Sorensen 2007; Baylis and Smith 2006; O’Brien and Williams 
2007). Hence, rather than being a substantial theory, social constructivism emphasises 
the need for a widening of the materialist ontology of realism and liberalism (Barnett 
2006:252). Drawing upon critical and sociological theory, social constructivists (such as 
Finnemore 1996; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1992 and 1999; Adler 2000) demonstrate the 
effect of ideas and normative structures on world politics.  
 
Constructivists argue that because they it is a social construct, global governance must 
be understood as having a profoundly social quality. Norms, culture and ideas play a 
significant role. Hence, a shift in the way one thinks of global governance may 
profoundly change the nature of it. While the international system or structure shapes 
the agents on the international arena, agents may also shape – or produce – the 
structure. Any interpretation of reality depends on the knowledge of the interpreter. 
This importance placed on concepts such as ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ is important 
for the analytical framework of this study.  
 
Cox also points out that a change in material conditions alone may not be enough to 
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create a shift in the behaviour of the actors within the system. For instance, he argues, in 
The Political Economy of a Plural World, that an effective, concerted reaction to the 
environmental crisis will only take place if our understanding of humanity’s place in 
nature and the biosphere is reconstructed (2002:88). Cox’s argument is not that 
environmental decay is not real, or that it does not affect us, as a material condition. 
Rather, his point is that any reaction to the environmental decay cannot be conceived as 
an automatic response to changing material conditions. In Vichian terms, the ‘mind’ 
must be active. 
 
The inclusion of constructivist thought in the analytical framework of this thesis is in 
part owed to the useful concepts of diffusion and norms cascade – which are central 
themes of global change within constructivism. Moreover, constructivism offers 
important insight into any study of shifting perceptions of reality. As Cox, constructivists 
find it difficult to account for profound systemic change without taking a social 
dimension into account. Structural forces have limited influence (Wendt 1995). 
Prominent constructivist Peter Katzenstein (1996: 21) claims that “[s]tate interests and 
strategies are shaped by a never ending political process that generates publicly 
understood standards for action.” States’ ability to cooperate depends in part on 
whether their identities generate self-interests or collective interests. In fact, as 
Alexander Wendt notes: “…the state itself is a testimony to the role of collective identity 
in human affairs.” (Wendt 1994: 384). In studying international organisations, 
constructivists therefore seek to uncover the social content of organisations, the 
dominant norms that govern behaviour and shape interest, and to decipher how these 
actions in turn influence actors.  
 
For, say constructivists, “[s]tates are socialized to accept new norms, values, and 
perceptions of interest by international organisations” (Finnemore 1996: 5). 
International organisations, then, may serve as agents of social construction, as norm 
entrepreneurs, trying to change social understandings (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). 
As such, they can be both teachers and creators of norms. Finnemore (1996) has also 
examined the ways in which international organisations socialise states into accepting 
political goals and new values. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), for example, have – through a mixture of persuasion and coercion – taught states 
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that liberalising one’s economies is the way to further development. The former of the 
two organisations, also acted as a proponent for the concept of poverty alleviation on 
international and national agenda in the late 1960s. The shift in discourse occurred as 
the World Bank ‘sold’ poverty alleviation to its members, redefining in the process what 
states were supposed to do to ameliorate the situation (Karns and Mingst 2004: 51). 
Thus, to constructivists international organisations are not merely organs through 
which actors on the international scene may take action, but have in themselves 
potential to be purposive actors with independent effects of international relations. 
Activity taking place within international organisations is important to understand the 
processes of changing understandings and behaviour with respect to a number of 
problems. 
 
Constructivists share the concern of critical theorists about the need for deconstruction 
of ‘social facts’ in order to better understand events and actors in international relations. 
Some even see constructivism, which is concerned with showing that the reality of 
world politics is not given, but subjectively interpreted and a product of human action as 
part of the realm of critical theories (Wendt 1999:71).  
 
The famous words of Alexander Wendt that “anarchy is what states make of it”, imply 
that neither international history nor international politics are unchanging phenomena. 
Rather, considerable change becomes possible, because people and states can start 
thinking about each other in new ways and thus create new norms that may be very 
different from old ones. Both states and the system governing their relations are 
artefacts, created and experienced by man. Indeed, because reality is a social construct, 
it exists per me, rather than per se. The notion of an objective reality is dismissed, both 
by constructivists and critical theorists. Just as theory exists for someone and some 
purpose, reality, or ‘truth’, exists only in relation to someone. As subjective entities, they 
can be changed and developed in new ways, merely through a change of thought. Critical 
constructivists32 argue that truth claims are always intimately linked to power. Because 
there is no neutral ground where one can decide what is true, ‘truth’ cannot be 
separated from power. Because this thesis is produced at a time in which the truth of the 
                                                        
32 Amongst the most prominent critical constructivists are David Campbell, Jim George, James Der Derian, 
R. B. J. Walker, Andrew Linklater and Ann Tickner 
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G20 is in the making – through the production of information about the group – it is 
important to remain conscious of the question of what the truth of the G20 and its 
impact in change in global governance is. A combination of tools from the constructivist 
toolbox and from the critical theory of Robert Cox is well suited to that task.  
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4 Deconstructing ‘Change’: the G20 
and the Post-Crisis Economic and 
Institutional Order 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study critically examines some of the changes that have occurred in the global 
governance architecture since the creation of the G20. Drawing on the analytical tools 
outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter breaks down those changes into three 
main dimensions: the material, the institutional and the ideational. The hope is that by 
deconstructing the changes in global governance related to the G20, and then studying 
them in turn, some light may be shed on the nature of those changes as a whole. As the 
three dimensions are intertwined, it is not possible to study one dimension without 
necessarily touching on the other. However, for the purpose of clarity, the discussion of 
this chapter is organised in three main sections. The first deals with the material aspects 
of the changes in the global governance structure by looking at developments in global 
economic power relations. The subsequent section then turns to the question of what 
changes one might observe in the institutional realm of global governance, before the 
final part of the chapter examines nature and extent of the possible ideational changes in 
such governance. 
 
4.2 Material Power Shifts in Global Governance  
Both accounts of the G20, and accounts of the effects accompanying the 2008 global 
economic crisis tend to begin in the material world. Material change is the most tangible 
of changes and often seems – whether consciously or not – to be presumed to come 
prior to more abstract change. Although he finds it to be a rather overused statement, 
more than an ontological principle, Cox believes that anything that can be known or 
experienced must have material reality in some sense (Cox 2002: 31-32). This study 
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endorses a complex understanding of the relationship between processes of change in 
different dimensions – such as the material, institutional and ideational – and rejects the 
notion of unidirectional influence between them. One could also have begun the 
examination of what changes the G20 represents and brings about in global governance 
by looking at the ideational dimension. This said, it is clear that the creation of the G20 
should not be seen in isolation from considerable shifts in global economic power 
relations.  
 
A salient feature of contemporary international relations is that some emerging 
economies have strengthened their position relative to the already established 
economies. The 2008 global economic crisis has highlighted this shift. Several states in 
the Global South (China, India, Brazil, Algeria and South Korea, amongst others), despite 
suffering disproportionate losses in their stock markets, now have larger reserves of 
foreign exchange than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Palat 2009). In its early 
predictions of economic growth as the world is coming out of recession, the IMF expects 
emerging markets and developing economies to continue to improve their relative 
standings. For, while the World Economic Outlook Report of the IMF, published in July 
2010, predicted a 4,6 per cent growth for the world’s combined Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), there were considerable regional differences. For instance, Europe was expected 
to achieve a mere 1 per cent growth, compared to 3,25 per cent for the US, 2,5 per cent 
for Japan and an average of 6,75 per cent for emerging and developing markets 
(Economic Outlook Report 2010). The transformation of the US from being the world’s 
largest creditor at the time of the IMF’s creation, to being the world’s largest debtor in 
2009 is yet another example of trends suggesting that a power shift is occurring in the 
world economy (Woods 2010a: 53). By the 31st July 2011, in the midst of the American 
debt crisis, the US debt to foreign creditors had reached a formidable USD4500 billion  
(Christensen 2011), with China holding 1152 billions of the debt and Japan – whose 
importance for the US economy is occasionally forgotten in all the attention devoted to 
Sino-American relations – holding USD906 billion of the debt33.  
 
                                                        
33 Great Britain and Brazil occupy the next two spots on the list of US debtors, holding USD333 and 
USD206 billion respectively of the US debt (Christensen 2011) 
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In a report, published in the International Economic Bulletin, November 2009, Dadush 
and Stancil present projections for the expected GDP growth of G20 nations (excluding 
the EU) to 2050. The projections are derived from assumptions about labour force 
growth (drawn from US census data), rates of investment, and speed of technological 
change. They expand on previous studies, including those done by Goldman Sachs, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the World Bank, by adjusting for initial quality of 
governance, education, and infrastructure, as well as updating population and 
investment rate projections. 
 
Table 4.1 
(Average annual GDP growth per cent change (y/y)) 
  
Pre-Crisis Trend (1997-
2007) 
Crisis Years (2007-
2009) 
Projections (2009-
2050) 
Argentina 2.62 2.01 4.09 
Australia 3.56 1.54 2.85 
Brazil 2.8 2.17 4.16 
Canada 3.29 -1.04 2.62 
China 9.62 8.76 5.56 
France 2.36 -1.03 2.09 
Germany 1.56 -2.08 1.44 
India 7 6.35 6.19 
Indonesia 2.68 5.02 5.01 
Italy 1.46 -3.11 1.27 
Japan 1.15 -3.07 1.08 
Korea 4.3 0.61 2.47 
Mexico 3.32 -3.09 4.29 
Russia 5.68 -1.19 3.33 
Saudi Arabia 3.23 1.75 4.7 
South Africa 3.67 0.41 4.28 
Turkey 4.05 -2.87 4.33 
United 
Kingdom 
2.89 -1.86 2.13 
United States 3.01 -1.16 2.7 
Source: Dadush and Stancil (2009) 
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Table 4.2  
(GDP projections for the US, China and India compared) 
 
Moreover, Dadush and Stancil (2009) find that the US is likely to be joined by China and 
India as a leading economy in 205034. As table 4.2 shows, they project that China will 
replace the US as the world’s preeminent economic power in 2032. While the US will 
remain a global leader, due to the current size of its economy and a projected annual 
growth of 2.7 percent, it seems clear that the relative strengthening of countries such as 
China and India is likely to force the US to cede some authority to those rising powers. It 
should be noted that the picture appears different if one studies the GDP of the 
economies per capita, rather than in absolute terms, as the wide disparity in per capita 
GDP will persist35. This becomes clear when studying table 4.3, containing results of a 
Goldman Sachs study quoted by Tibergien (2010). 
 
                                                        
34 According to the projections of Dadush and Stancil (2009) the total GDP of the three economies, in real 
US dollar terms, is projected to be over 70 percent more than that of the other G20 countries combined.  
 
35 Dadush and Stancil (2009) suggest that the extraordinary per-capita wealth of the US might actually 
work against its bid to lead, as the much lower per capita incomes in India and China will be perceived as 
more representative of the world population, potentially reinforcing their authority. 
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Table 4.3 
(Absolute GDP of the 20 largest economies of the world versus their GDP per capita) 
 
Source: Tiberghien (2010) 
 
 
4.2.1 Caveats Bound to Long-term Projections of this Kind 
Naturally, such long-term projections are based on assertions that macroeconomic 
policies remain sound, that catastrophes do not occur and that markets stay open. Hence, 
they provide only an educated assessment of broad developments in the international 
economy, arguably overly based on ideas of linear development. While presenting the 
world in such aggregated numbers may be fascinating, it does not always draw an 
accurate picture of local realities. If one disaggregates the numbers of the study and 
studies single economies, the picture may not appear as clear-cut as the projections may 
indicate. For example, the numbers presented in the above table project that Mexico will 
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grow by 4.29% from 2009 until 2050. Meanwhile, Mexico has not grown at that rate for 
a long time (Naím 2010). Therefore, while they may indeed be criticised for being linear, 
in some cases such models assume some important discontinuities in order for their 
projections to be realised. One underlying assumption in order for this to happen seems 
to be that new technologies will be developed, which will allow countries that have not 
shown great propensity for growth to acquire sustained levels of growth. In short, when 
one dissects the particular countries in the study, their growth histories do not always 
match those upon which such studies are based.  
 
What would happen, for instance, if China suffered from a growth-impairing accident? 
Only in the mid-1990s was it believed that it was Japan, and not China, which would 
represent the main challenger to the American economy (Lundestad 2010: 312). 
Although China’s demography is significantly different to that of Japan, it remains clear 
that an economic downturn similar to that experienced by Japan as a result of the Asian 
crisis would be likely to alter the predictions of Chinese growth rates considerably. Not 
to mention the potential threat that social or political unrest in China represents. 
Moreover, even if China should surpass the US in absolute terms within the next decade 
or two it would still be considerably behind the US in relative terms, with a GDP per 
capita of only one quarter of that of the US (ibid.). 
 
This said, there is value in placing oneself in a frame of mind where one allows oneself to 
reflect on future developments in the way such projections allow. Moreover, regardless 
of pace and magnitude, the projections here presented reinforce the impression left by 
the IMF predictions that an economic power shift is occurring.  
 
4.2.2 Implications 
The strengthening of emerging countries relative to developed economies is not a new 
trend. A 2003 Goldman Sachs study showed that for the first time in the modern era, 
economic growth is bringing non-Western developing countries into the top ranks of the 
world system (Ikenberry 2008). However, neither those numbers, nor the projections 
made by the IMF referred to above should be interpreted as suggesting that all 
developing countries are strengthening their position relative to the developed world. A 
number of developing economies have been particularly vulnerable to the economic 
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downturn in the wake of the crisis. For the weakest – amongst whom a disproportionate 
number are on the African continent – the direct economic implications of the recession 
range from a substantial decline in aid and foreign investment to the diminishing of 
security in financial institutions, and an increase of the balance-of-payments deficit, 
following a decrease in international trade and cargo flows (Committee of African 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 2009; Moolakkattu 2009: 11). For the 
already marginalised groups within such countries, this means even lower standards of 
living and increasing poverty, following as a consequence of declining employment 
opportunities and aid.  
 
The Goldman Sachs study further noted that, if the economic trends uncovered by the 
study continued, the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – 
could have economies that together would be larger than the old G6 advanced 
countries36 by 2050. According to those economic projections, China would surpass the 
Europeans and Japan by 2020 and the United States by 2045. Later studies by Goldman 
Sachs, which take the 2008 global economic crisis into account, have projected that 
China will pass the US in terms of GDP, as soon as 2027 (Storeng 2011). Commenting on 
the latter of the studies during a seminar in Oslo, British historian Niall Ferguson (2011) 
suggested that this might happen even before 2027. Regardless of the exact timing, 
those projections make clear (1) that the political economic power relations between 
those at the world order level have been gradually shifting over a long period and (2) 
that it is not only Western countries that can prosper within the neoliberal world order. 
Fast-growing developing countries are already an international economic force to be 
reckoned with. Developing countries already produce more than half of the global 
domestic gross product (GDP). They hold most of the world’s financial reserves and are 
placing substantial demands on energy and raw materials (Ikenberry and Wright 2008). 
 
These are noteworthy developments, with potentially far-reaching implications for 
power and governance in world politics. The middle-tier developing countries are rising 
up and forcing change in the global system. As the BRICS are being identified as key 
‘movers and shakers’ among emerging powers, the developed economies of the West 
experience relative decline (Kornegay 2009).  
                                                        
36 The United States, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy 
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The collective size and impact of the BRICS countries on trade make them important 
players, who are increasingly difficult to ignore or leave outside the doors of power. 
Since the declaration concluding their first summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, the 
BRICS countries have called for the establishment of a multi-polar world order, 
demanding access to the key governance forums of international relations. 
Acknowledging the greater political and economic clout of key emerging states, they are 
increasingly being invited to participate in global forums, to which they have not 
previously enjoyed the same access. The initiation of summit-level G20 meetings may be 
seen as an example in this regard.  
 
4.3 The G20 and Institutional Change 
Exactly when the US will have to cede its place as the biggest economy in the world to 
China is debatable and predictions of the timing and significance of this event vary. 
Nevertheless, the point that there is a shift in the relative material capabilities of 
important states in the world system cannot be escaped; a material shift in global 
governance is happening. One of several interesting questions to arise in the face of 
these developments is what the consequences of this are likely to be for the traditional 
institutions of global governance.  
 
To some extent, the power shift in international relations examined above has created a 
global governance problem: representing an increasingly larger share of the world’s 
population and economy, the non-G7/8 members of the G20 encounter a democratic 
deficit in the Bretton Woods institutions of global governance. How has this problem 
been tackled at an institutional level?  
 
A material shift alone cannot explain the creation of the G20, nor does it guarantee a 
revision of our understanding of the global order. It is clear, however, that the creation 
of the G20 itself marks an important alteration of global governance. In several regards, 
the G20 represents a novelty in global governance. Its membership is unlike that of 
previous groups, and its potential power arguably unparalleled amongst the Gs. The G20 
is the only international forum in which major developed and developing nations meet 
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as equals at the highest level of government. As such, the G20 stands in contrast to the 
two-tiered UN Security Council, the weighted voting of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the more restricted Group of Seven and/or 
Eight (G7/8). However, the impact of the G20 on the body of international institutions is 
not limited to the formation of the group itself. The G20 has caused both alterations in 
other institutions and the way in which these institutions relate to each other.  
 
4.3.1 Reviving Multilateralism 
One important aspect of the new G20 process is its bolstering of existing multilateral 
institutions. That places the group in the situation in which it may at the same time be 
seen to be a result of the inadequacy of the existing bodies of global governance, and as 
the only institution capable of saving those very same bodies.  
 
In the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis, the G20 summits have been crucial in 
reinvigorating global cooperation. The organisation of choice of the G7/8, the IMF, has 
been at the heart of its response. The investment of nearly USD1 trillion (Woods 2010a: 
51) of resources in the IMF agreed upon through G20 summitry seems in some regards 
to have promoted a belief in global cooperation that was quite limited before the crisis. 
Ngaire Woods (ibid.) describes G20 summitry as a “transfusion of blood” into 
multilateralism, providing first aid to a set of international economic institutions that 
had begun to wane in importance prior to the crisis. The World Bank and the IMF are 
two examples of such institutions.   
 
The decrease in relative economic power of the G7/8 countries described above seems 
to have reduced the authority of the G7/8. This resulted in less weight being given to its 
policymaking, and also that of the key governance institutions it supported – and still 
supports. Lack of legitimacy also became a major challenge for both the World Bank and 
the IMF. In the World Bank this became particularly apparent as the appointment of 
Paul Wolfowitz, described by some as politically partisan, led the World Bank into a 
crisis of credibility. This crisis of legitimacy was felt economically as well. The IMF 
suffered financially, as non-G7/8 fee-paying countries increasingly turned elsewhere, 
while new ways to finance the institution were not developed (Woods, 2010a: 52).  
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Also, it should be noted that the reality within which the G20 exists is a demanding one 
for global cooperation. In an interview with the government-owned Norwegian 
Broadcasting Company, Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre pointed out that 
the power relations in global governance have changed considerably since he was 
appointed foreign minister in 2005 (NRK 2011). Whilst G7/8 and G20 meetings at the 
beginning of his career as foreign minister were largely dominated by one state – the US 
– recent G20 activity is marked by a reality in which the voices of several actors – China, 
Brazil and India in particular – bear considerable weight. Conflicting outlooks on the 
world might make it more difficult to reach agreement. This becomes particularly clear 
when observing the standstill in the ongoing DOHA-round and the difficulties of 
reaching a consensus on how to tackle the challenges of climate change. On the other 
hand one might imagine that a wider set of perspectives on how to tackle global issues 
might also break those very same deadlocks. In an address to the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, in January 2011, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stated that he was 
more optimistic about the next meetings of the DOHA-round after the G20 summitry 
began (BBC 2011a). Although more people involved means a broader agenda and less 
room for agreement than with the G7/8, the members of the G20 share an overriding 
interest in the stability of the international system, and G20 leaders have, on several 
occasions, proved willing to work in concert to stabilise the global economy. 
 
Some oppose this view, seeing G20 cooperation in 2008 and 2009 as a short-lived 
collective reaction to the panic following the 2008 global economic crisis. The IMF 
meeting in Washington in the last half of 2010 and the G20 meeting in Seoul ended with 
warnings of a global currency war and of a return to the national economic barriers of 
the 1930s. During both summits, the world’s leading economies differed greatly on the 
choice of strategy to exit the economic turmoil (Bremmer and Gordon 2011). These 
developments have led some scholars to describe current global governance as 
dominated by a G-Zero (see for instance Bremmer and Roubini 2011; Bremmer and 
Gordon 2011), describing a reality in which the US – in the wake of the 2008 global 
economic crisis – is no longer the leader of the global economy, and no other nation has 
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the political and economic leverage to replace it37. In such a reality, the G20 runs the risk 
of being an arena of conflict, rather than one of compromise. Others have suggested that 
the two major powers of the world – China and the US – could form a ‘Group of 2’ (G2), 
thereby marginalising the G20 process. Thus far, however, China has refused to play the 
G2 game (Tiberghien 2010: 7). Amongst other, the Chinese hesitation might be seen as 
an indication that the country still sees the US as too strong a partner for an informal 
forum of two. Regardless of the reason however, this leaves both countries in a situation 
where they involve themselves in the coalition of the G20. 
 
4.3.2 World Bank and IMF Reform 
When the financial crisis hit in full force at the end of 2008, the G20 was in clear 
ascendancy over other institutions, including the IMF (Cooper and Bradford 2010). 
Indeed, the case can be made that of all the international organisations, the IMF was 
amongst those with the most severe legitimacy “deficit” over the past decade. From the 
very first G20 summit an action plan, delegating specific tasks to international 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, was developed38. Now given a place at 
the top table, China, India and Brazil have promised substantial contributions to the IMF. 
After the London Summit the UK government announced that China would contribute 
some USD 40 billion to the IMF (Xuequan 2009), and not long after it became clear that 
Brazil and India planned ‘contributions’ as well (Sanford and Weiss 2009: 13).  
 
The G20 translated summitry initiative for reform into actual reform. The shifts in 
voting rights within both the IMF and the World Bank, agreed upon during the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit, may be seen as two reactions to those pressures. The two bodies 
have undergone reform so as to better accommodate the needs of the developing world 
too. The need for new ways to generate income, the need for increased legitimacy, and 
the need to adapt to the above-sketched power-shift seem to be three forces driving the 
World Bank and the IMF towards reform. When Dominique Strauss-Kahn took over as 
managing director of the IMF in 2007, he announced that reform of the institution’s 
governance, mandate and financial structure was needed in order to enhance – or even 
                                                        
37 While the discussion of the material change in this study has shown that the US will continue to be the 
strongest, and perhaps only truly global, power, it increasingly lacks the resources and domestic political 
capital to act as primary provider of global public goods. 
38 See Simian, Nicholas (2009) in the bibliography of this study to find the document in its entirety 
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restore – its relevance, legitimacy and effectiveness (Woods 2010a: 53). At the same 
time, the institution’s hegemon – the US – called for reform of the IMF so as to reflect the 
growing weight of dynamic emerging markets in the global economy (ibid.).  
 
The G20 economies left Pittsburgh with an agreement to give developing countries 
greater voting rights in the two major financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. 
With regards to the IMF, G20 leaders committed to shift at least 5 per cent of the 
institution’s internal voting rights to the developing world, and tasked it with a greater 
role in monitoring economic policy. Similar alterations were made with regards to the 
World Bank, where the voting rights of under-represented countries were increased by 
at least 3 per cent (Woods 2010a: 52). Taken together, the governance reforms prior to 
the crisis effected an overall shift of 5.4 per cent of voting power in the IMF towards 
important emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico. Some countries 
were even prepared to forego a part of the quota increase for which they were eligible, 
including Italy, Japan, Germany and the US (ibid.: 53). The emphasis of the financial 
reform was on reducing the IMF’s dependency on income from emerging economy 
members that borrowed from it. The aim was to create a more independent IMF. During 
the 2008 global economic crisis, however, the IMF took loans from developed economies 
in order to acquire sufficient lending power to meet the crisis (ibid.).  
 
More importantly, the described changes were paired with an announcement 
underscoring G20 primacy over the G7/8. The US President Obama confirmed in a 
statement that the G20 – in the view of the US – fulfils its self-proclaimed role as the 
premier forum for economic cooperation (AFP 2009). Moreover, the two days in 
Pittsburgh form part of a set of events which has led some to characterise the G20 as 
nothing short of a “seismic shift in global economic diplomacy” (The Economic Times 
2009). Even before the crisis, the IMF initiated both governance reforms and financial 
reforms to respond to these pressures, hoping that the two sets of reforms would 
simultaneously make the IMF more representative and less financially dependent on any 
particular group of countries for income (Woods 2010a: 53). The idea seems to have 
been that greater representation would bring emerging economies closer to the IMF, 
while independent finances would give the organisation greater capacity to deliver on 
its mandate.  
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4.3.3 Revision, rather than Reform 
While the IMF has achieved a small increase in the institution’s own resources since the 
financial crisis, the G20’s promise to treble the institution’s resources, so as to make 
some USD 1 trillion available to the IMF, has been mostly in the form of credit lines 
(Woods 2010a: 55). This means that the IMF has not had its capital increased. Rather, 
the new money comprises credit lines which member countries have made available to 
the IMF if it needs them. The question as to who the countries making those lines 
available to the IMF are is relevant to this study, because such an arrangement is likely 
to secure an IMF that remains tied to the providers of credit lines. Closer examination 
shows that substantial parts of such credit are made available by existing powerful 
shareholders. This means that the IMF remains firmly tied to its traditional pattern of 
power and influence, within which G7/8 countries have been heading the game. The 
institution’s dependence on loans from its wealthiest members prevents its dramatic 
reform and only weakly offers incentives for considerable change. One might therefore 
question how much change the switch from G7/8 to G20 ascendancy over the IMF has 
created.  
 
The reforms, aimed at reflecting the rise in economic power of emerging economies, 
have been both moderate and hard won. The fruits of much tough negotiation have not 
been enough to offset the perception of emerging economies that the IMF is an 
institution under considerable US influence. The US still has veto power in the IMF and 
senior management is all appointed only with the approval of Europe and the US. By 
unwritten, tacit, agreement the managing director of the IMF is a European, and the 
president of the World Bank is a US citizen. This agreement was reaffirmed by the choice 
of former French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde to succeed Strauss-Kahn as head of 
the IMF, instead of installing the first non-European at the head of the fund. Moreover, 
the institution is located amongst US government agencies in Washington DC and works 
in English, with a large proportion of its staff being trained in the US (Woods 2010a: 56). 
Thus, although progress was made at the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, the perception of 
insignificant reform still lingers. In some ways, the above-sketched reforms seem to be 
better described as revisionist rather than reformist. At first glance, the discrepancy 
between the considerable changes of global economic power relations and the moderate 
changes in the set of global institutions governing those relations is puzzling; how can 
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the challenges, and changes, to the existing system remain so limited when economic 
power is shifting to the extent that it is?  
 
The rise of new powers is a classic problem of international relations and is a potential 
source of conflict and violence. As both the Gramscian notion of hegemony and more 
classic hegemonic theory teaches us, established powers have organised the 
international system – an activity in which the creation of rules and institutions is 
central – so as to make it work smoothly, and, whether consciously or subconsciously, 
maintain it. Change occurs when powers rise to greatness and decline, and as they 
struggle over the institutions and rules of order. Robert Gilpin contends that “a 
precondition for political change lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system 
and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most from a 
change in the system” (Gilpin 1981: 9). As the discussion hitherto in this chapter has 
aimed at showing, the full impact of the shift in economic power relations has yet to be 
reflected in the global institutions, thereby leaving a disjuncture between the existing 
social system and the redistribution of power. As will be further discussed under section 
4.4, part of the explanation for this might be found in the ideas, or mindsets, of central 
actors in global governance. Another part of the account, however, seems to lie in the 
relative strength of emerging economies in material terms. While those economies have 
gained a greater voice in terms of the setting of policies, it seems that they remain too 
weak to challenge the balance of the international system in a dramatic way. This is not 
due to the degree of material change alone, but might also be explained by limited 
South-South cooperation.  
 
The development of formalised linkages and alliances (such as the BRICS) reflects a 
potentially interesting development in global governance, as elites from developing 
economies seek to enhance their economic and political power relative to the developed 
world. Yet, as Ian Taylor (2006) has pointed out, it seems premature to see such 
activities as reflecting a call for a revised international order. Thus far, evidence suggests 
that the developing world operates in groups, rather than as one block. One point in this 
regard is that the interests of the economies of the developing world are diverse; not all 
developing countries necessarily have an interest in acting as a block. It is relatively 
uninteresting to speak of a shift of voting rights towards developing countries in an 
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organisation such as the IMF if one does not simultaneously look at whom the main 
beneficiaries of such shifts are – however minor those shifts may be.  
 
In the case of the governance reforms of the IMF, the largest ‘winners’ seem to be Korea, 
Singapore, Turkey, China, India, Brazil and Mexico39, none of which are amongst the 
weakest economies in the developing world. The Pittsburgh compromise of a further 
shift of 5 per cent of voting power towards developing countries was one endorsed by 
the BRICS, but has also been criticised for its lack of ambition. Hence, in reaching out 
towards developing economies the IMF seems, thus far, to have met the wants and needs 
of some better than others. It is not the task of this thesis to speculate about whether 
more substantial alterations could have been achieved if the BRICS had aligned with the 
poorest economies, but it is noteworthy that the main proponents for far-reaching 
institutional change are not countries such as the BRICS, but rather countries such as 
Venezuela, Iran, Bolivia, and Libya. In fact, studying the implications of the integration of 
emerging economies into top-level world governance it seems that the rising South are 
more prone to work within the confines of the existing realm of global institutions, 
rather than to develop their own institutions or build alliances amongst themselves in 
pursuit of their economic and political goals.  
 
There are examples of power transitions that have not overturned the old order.. When 
Japan grew from 5 per cent of the American Gross National Product in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War to over 60 per cent of its size in the wake of the Cold 
War, it did so without challenging the existing world order (Ikenberry and Wright 2008: 
8). Yet, the degree to which the current changes in relative power takes place, without 
forcing more substantial changes in the existing order, is remarkable. The potential for 
military conflict is hardly discussed, as E.H. Carr’s ‘problem of peaceful change’ almost 
appears to be a concern of the past40 – although it should be mentioned that China’s 
much vaunted building of an aircraft carrier (Grammaticas 2011) is a visible symbol of 
the country’s rise as a military power too. This illustrates the point that there are 
different types of power ascendancies and power transitions. Where rising powers, such 
                                                        
39 Although from their perspective the changes were relatively small. China’s share of votes in the 
organisation was increased by a mere 0.88 per cent, taking its share of the votes to a total of 3.81 per cent  
of votes. India’s voting power rose to 2.31 per cent, while Brazil and Mexico raised their shares to 1.72 per 
and 1.47 per cent respectively (Woods 2010a: Table A1 in the Appendix). 
40 Although the content of Carr’s notion of what the concept of “peace” entails could stand some discussion. 
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as Bismarck’s Germany, challenged the system, others, such as Japan, fit into the existing 
system. Moreover, whereas some power transitions have resulted in a transformed 
international order others have brought about only limited adjustments in the regional 
and global system.  
 
One of those less enthusiastic about the prospects of the G20 as a driver of systemic 
reform is former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson. He has called the G20 strategy for 
reform “sophisticated delaying action”, suggestively describing the G20 as “masters of 
economic policy spin at work”. Johnson outlines how important reforms with political 
content, such as capital requirements or bank bonuses, are sent out to technical 
committees because of their complexity. Because this takes years, the suggestions for 
reform become watered down. He claims that there is little political will for 
implementation: “There will be some minor changes, and these will be much trumpeted. 
But what will really change in or around the power structure of global finance - as it 
plays out in the United States, Western Europe, or anywhere else? Nothing” (Bretton 
Woods Project 2009). 
 
Although the effects of it are still unclear, it is clear that the distribution of economic 
power has undergone and is still to undergo significant alterations. While the G20 and 
some of the discussions within the G20 framework may suggest that such alterations 
have translated into some institutional change, it may be argued that with the new 
emerging states – headed by BRICS – little attempt has been made to overturn the old 
order and completely reorganise the rules and institutions of the system. So what role is 
the G20 playing in the international governance architecture? 
 
4.3.4 A New Hub of Global Governance  
The definition of the G20’s primary purpose and role will only evolve as its agenda is 
clarified. What is clear, however, is that with the continuation of G20 summitry, as large 
parts of the world are coming out of recession, the group seems to be moving from the 
role of crisis-buster to that of steering committee. For, while it may be true that the 
group has yet to turn global governance upside down in economic and institutional 
terms, there is little doubt that it occupies a central place in international relations. The 
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image of the G20 has been that it has functioned as a pivot of concerted global 
cooperation in extraordinary times (Cooper and Bradford, 2010: 4). Now recognised as 
the premier forum for global economic cooperation, some have begun to see the G20 as 
a new form of centralised “concert of great powers” (Åslund 2009). Whatever label one 
applies, the point remains that the G20 today possesses a high degree of global authority. 
 
While it is true that the long-term role of the G20 in global governance remains unclear, 
it has been on the centre stage of global governance since its inception at a summit-level. 
Through the Washington Plan of Action – created at the inaugural meeting of the group – 
the G20 moved to position itself as the core crisis committee over other institutions by 
establishing working groups charged with developing collective positions on reform 
efforts by the IMF, World Bank and other multilateral development banks. The group 
developed its role further during the London summit in 2009. Cooper and Bradford 
(2010: 5) describe the role of the G20 as a distinctively catalytic one. In accordance with 
the Washington Plan of Action, officials from each of the G20 countries where active in 
working groups41, aimed at developing policies for global recovery efforts (Simian 2009). 
The report that followed – The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform – demonstrated the 
innovative capacity of the G20 in heading an international crisis response where 
collective state action was superseded by existing institutional arrangements. 
 
4.3.5 Spoke Institutions 
The above-sketched reforms of the IMF and the World Bank are examples of the 
ascendancy the G20 has enjoyed over core institutions since the Washington summit. 
Measures such as the reforms advanced at the London and Pittsburgh summits 
represent more than a modernisation of the governance structures of the World Bank 
and the IMF; they also strengthen the role of the G20 as a global steering group. More 
than two years after the G20 entered into the inner-circles of global governance, its role 
in relationship to key governing bodies and institutions is becoming increasingly clear.  
                                                        
41 The Working Groups, established in Washington focused on: enhancing sound regulation and 
strengthening transparency; reinforcing international cooperation and promoting integrity in financial 
markets; reforming the IMF; and the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (Cooper and 
Bradford 2010: 5) 
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The IMF 
At an institutional level, one particularly interesting consequence of the G20 entering 
the stage at a functional level has been the re-emergence of the IMF as a pivotal and 
credible institution. Although completion of the reforms of the IMF and the World Bank 
is needed to make the institutions ‘crisis ready’ in the event of another downturn, both 
institutions – the IMF in particular – seem to have been strengthened through this crisis. 
Moreover, they both seem to accept G20 ascendancy. The IMF has on a number of 
occasions stated that it is subordinate to the G20, seeing its role as one of acting as an 
instrument for G20 policies and aiding the G20 in assessing the wider implications of 
those policies. According to the director of IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review 
Department, the G20 sees its role “… as a trusted advisor, with the G20 firmly in the 
driver’s seat” (Moghadam 2009). In that sense the IMF and the G20 may be seen to 
mutually reinforce each other, securing both central places in the global governance 
architecture. By December 2009, the IMF announced that it was shifting from ‘rescue 
efforts’ to ensuring longer-term stability (IMF 2009). The IMF also seems to have more 
ambitious objectives. Having responded to the crisis through what former IMF Managing 
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn saw an innovative mix of measures, the IMF sees its 
systemic importance to have been enhanced since the initiation of G20 summitry, 
positing that “the formal mandate of the fund may not fully capture what is expected by 
an effective guardian of global macroeconomic stability” (Cooper and Bradford 2010: 6; 
IMF 2009). It is noteworthy that this new ambition of the IMF makes clear the limits of 
the institution as a parallel hub to the G20. The IMF itself has pointed out that it holds a 
“strictly advisory capacity” in its relationship with the G20. It has also avoided any 
suggestion that the IMF has any technical mechanism or legal right to compel changes in 
the policies of non-borrowing members (Cooper and Bradford 2010: 6). All it can do is 
assess whether additional adjustments are necessary to reach the growth objectives 
outlined by the G20 and the desired financial stability (Barkley 2010). 
The Financial Stability Board 
Another example of G20’s institutional capacity is found in the creation of the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), which replaced the Financial Stability Forum. The FSB has been 
entrusted with key responsibilities in the oversight of international finance and 
monitoring of national economic policies to promote balanced and sustainable growth. 
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Central to this has been the task of establishing, in coordination with the IMF, an early-
warning system for crises (Paulson 2010: 334-335).  
 
The creation of the FSB proves that the G20 has the capacity not only to reform but also 
to create institutions. Moreover, the creation of the FSB is interesting in that it reveals 
something of the institutional character of the G20 itself. For, while the G20 is indeed a 
powerful club of states, it does not – by itself – wield much power without its spoke 
institutions. The creation of the FSB may in part be seen as a realisation of this. By itself, 
the G20 was not institutionalised enough to manage policy implementation across all 
member countries (Bradford 2009). Through the creation of the FSB the G20 designed 
an instrument that provides the group with a useful toolkit in that regard. As such, the 
metaphor of a steering committee introduced in this final chapter seems fitting; while 
the G20 decides on the priorities or order of business in several aspects of global 
governance, it does not directly effect the decisions taken. Rather, the approach of the 
group thus far seems to be to rearrange the realm of global institutions in a manner that 
will enable it to meet new challenges – an approach not dissimilar to that of the G7/8. 
The success of that approach remains to be seen. In the case of the FSB, the expectations 
of the board may be larger than the resources made available to it. Helleiner (2010), as 
well as Griffith-Jones, Helleiner and Woods (2010), and Cooper and Bradford (2010) 
have pointed out that despite the responsibilities placed upon it, the FSB operates 
within a limited budget and with a small complement of personnel. 
 
4.3.6 The G20 and Other Key Bodies of Global Governance 
The above discussion suggests that the G20 defends its role on the centre stage of 
international affairs well. As the G20 is emerging as the nexus of multilateralism it has 
been able to position the IMF and the FSB in a better way than other international 
bodies before it (Cooper and Bradford 2010: 7), and has revived a multilateralism that 
seemed more or less dead prior to the 2008 global economic crisis (Woods 2010). But 
how does the G20 position itself in relation to other central bodies of power in the 
contemporary order, such as the UN and the Group of 7/8? How has the creation of the 
G20 influenced the wider institutional realm? 
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The G20 does not and cannot operate in isolation from other international bodies. 
Rather, it acts through and complements the activities of other international institutions 
and organisations. The inclusion of the president of the World Bank, the managing 
director of the IMF and the chairpersons of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee and the Development Committee are obvious examples of how the G20 
process seeks integration in the activities of those institutions. Moreover, the G20 helps 
to coordinate the activities of other international groups and organisations, such as the 
Financial Stability Board. It also facilitates the deliberations of more formal bodies such 
as the aforementioned International Monetary and Financial Committee. Ever since the 
creation of the G20 at a ministerial level, an important part of the rationale for the 
continued meeting of the group members has been that the potential for developing 
common positions on complex issues amongst G20 members might expedite decision-
making in other fora (G20 Research Group, 2000). To what extent this has been the case 
is debatable, but there is general agreement that any matter in which the G20 manages 
to develop a common standpoint is likely to be tackled efficiently. 
The G20’s relationship to the United Nations 
The UN initially appeared supportive of the idea of G20 summitry (Cooper and Bradford 
2010: 7). Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-Moon offered the UN’s headquarters in 
New York as the summit site (Hell, 2008). In spite of several invitations, this was turned 
down, however. The G20 did not seem to have an interest in becoming part of the UN 
system, and the UN – instead of establishing itself as a part of the G20 system – has been 
marginalised from the G20 process.   
 
The distance between approaches of the G20 and the UN has been clear from the very 
first summit. In a press conference three days prior to the first summit, Ban Ki-Moon 
focused attention on the need for an inclusive multilateralism, with an emphasis on the 
needs of developing countries and pressing issues such as the climate crisis (Ki-Moon, 
2008), without obtaining a response from the G20. This partial neglect of the other 
body’s agenda is mutual. Amongst others, the General Assembly of the UN (UNGA) has 
increasingly become a forum for voicing discontent on the course of global governance 
(Cooper and Bradford 2010: 7). Rather than to work systematically in order to 
complement or support the G20, the UNGA has provided a forum for some of those left 
outside the G20 to voice their concerns. Organisationally, the main alternative focal 
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point became the UN Conference on the 2008 global economic crisis at the end of June 
2009 (ibid.). Convened after only two G20 summits, in which the economic response 
plan was widely perceived to have already been developed, the de facto purpose served 
by the initiative seems to have been to test the unity of the G20 with regards to the 
recovery efforts agreed upon in London. Ideationally, the principal source of contest 
came from an initiative by the UNGA president to call together a panel of experts with a 
mandate to propose reforms to the global financial and monetary system.   
 
The tardiness of the UN conference on the 2008 global economic crisis is telling of the 
UN’s response to the crisis. The initiative for G20 summitry may in part be seen as a 
reaction to the impotency of the UN facing the GFC. The G20 is a smaller and more 
flexible body of global governance, which fills a functional and thematic void in global 
governance left open by the UN. The UN is an organisation primarily concerned with 
security matters. While other central areas, such as social and economic development, 
human rights, and sustainable development have been added to the agenda of the UN, 
the history of the organisation shows that it is no simple task to introduce new topics to 
its traditional area of concern. (Schaller, quoted in Wroe 2011). While the UN has been 
fairly effective in some of its main areas of responsibilities, ‘club governance’ by groups 
such as the G7/8, the G20, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations have become more common regarding issues such as the 
2008 global economic crisis. In that regard, it is perhaps correct that the G20 is 
complementing the UN, rather than challenging or replacing it. The distinction between 
what the G20 and the UN does is becoming less clear-cut, however. In particular, the 
initiation of G20 summitry has contributed to this.  
 
The question as to whether the G20 can manage the shift from crisis-buster to world 
steering committee is related to that of what that steering committee will deal with; is 
the G20 broadening its agenda beyond economic issues? Organisationally, a closer look 
at G20 activity suggests that the agenda of the group broadened beyond the very 
technical economic issues as the group began its dual existence. One attraction for the 
leaders is the forum’s organisational looseness, which gives them the opportunity to mix 
policy deliberation with political talks with their counterparts (Cooper and Bradford 
2010: 9). Politically, there are also signs that the G20 is increasingly dealing with 
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security issues. After all, such issues are not unconnected with economic stability. For 
instance, the unrest in Egypt – which threatened to create a rise in the price of oil and, as 
a result, destabilise large parts of the global economy – was discussed during a G20 
meeting in Paris at the beginning of 2011 (Martinez 2011). Moreover, countries that are 
represented in the G20, but not in the UN Security Council, such as India, may prefer the 
G20, arguing that the G20 is more legitimate than the Security Council. Hence, while the 
G20 and the UN may be seen to be bodies of governance with separate agendas, there is 
a risk that they might hold conflicting positions if the G20 widens its agenda to matters 
other than economic. The study of how the UN will, or will not, adapt to the G20, as it 
gradually acquires the role of a global steering committee, will be tremendously 
interesting in the years to come. 
 
The lack of a clearly defined agenda for the G20 may cause a situation where some 
countries prefer it as a forum for global governance over the United Nations. One 
example that could be imagined is that of India.  in the G20, but not in the UN Security 
Council, it is not unthinkable that India could prefer the G20 as a forum for discussion on 
important issues over the Security Council.. The G20 may indeed be seen not to pose a 
threat to the UN Security Council, because it lacks the Council’s legal basis and year-
round sessions (Shorr and Wright, 2010: 188). Nevertheless, as long as substantial 
reform of the UN Security Council’s membership is not made, it is not unlikely that some 
countries may over time argue that the G20 is more legitimate than the UN Security 
Council.  
 
The organisation – or lack of organisation – of the G20 constitutes a threat to its ability 
to act as an effective body of global governance. Whereas the Security Council has 
received much criticism for its inability to circumvent the hindrances related to its 
number of members and – not least – the veto power of its permanent members, the G20 
has twenty members, all of whom have potential veto power, as the lack of rules for a 
veto in the G20 may be argued to give all its twenty members de facto veto power. While 
the G20 is not required to reach consensus in order to make decisions, its behaviour has 
thus far suggested that it is consensus-oriented. The group might therefore possibly 
constitute a greater barrier to agreement than bodies such as the Security Council and 
the G7/8, thereby reducing the nett cooperation in the global arena rather than reviving 
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it. As such, the group might – counter to what its bolstering of multilateral institutions 
such as the IMF suggests – represent a quantitative step backwards for global 
multilateralism. At the same time, however, the entry of G20 onto the main stage of 
global governance may represent something of a qualitative leap forward. While the 
decisions may eventually be fewer, they are more widely based. Perspectives other than 
the traditional Western dominant ones may become more important, thereby 
challenging the intersubjective understandings that have long prevailed in global 
governance.  
The G20 and the G7/8 
The claim can be made that the G20 may be seen as a continuation of, or an expansion of 
the G7/8, as much as it can be seen as a replacement of it. After all, the initiative for the 
creation of a G20 – both at a ministerial and at a leaders’ level – came from a leading 
member of the G7/8, the US. Before the bias in representation in the G20 – which 
becomes particularly clear with the over-representation of Europe42 – is dealt with, the 
G20 runs the risk of being perceived as little more than yet another step in the evolving 
Gs of global governance put together by the US. Yet, more interesting than concluding 
that the origin of the G20 is inextricably linked to the G7/8, is the question of whether 
the manner in which the group functions supports the notion that it represents but a 
widening of the circle of global governance drawn by the G7/8. Pivotal in the answer to 
that question is whether the ideational heritage of the G7/8 is to be found as a central 
guiding element in the work of the G20. Has the inclusion of emerging economies into a 
leaders’ group influenced the ideas and outcomes of the G20?  
 
As will be discussed under section 4.4, the ideas supported by the G20 do, in part, seem 
to underpin the notion that the G20 and the G7/8 are closely related. This was 
particularly true during the early years of the G20; while studies of the G20 finance 
ministers’ group at work reveal that in its early years it was a powerful forum for 
consensus-building in crisis management, forging consensus on a framework for debt 
restructuring and tackling the need for IMF quota reform, G20 outcomes were not so 
different to those of the G7/8 (Martinez-Diaz and Woods 2009). Moreover, the formal 
statements of the G20 echoed those of the finance ministers of the G7/8. This seems to 
                                                        
42 In addition to the big four established members of the G8 – the UK, France, Germany and Italy – the 
European Commission president has also gained entry to the G20 
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be less true today. For instance, Lee (2010: 1) argues that America’s capacity to ‘manage’ 
China and encourage it to rise as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ within a US-led system is 
failing: “China is too big, too proud, and too independent-minded to be ‘tamed’”. He finds 
support in Mann (2010), who suggests that “[t]he idea of a powerful United States 
bringing China into the existing system is fading”. According to the two prominent 
scholars quoted, therefore, the belief that China will be content to rise as a 'responsible 
stakeholder' in a US-led regional and global order is simply out of date. Moreover, while 
the finance ministers’ G20 somewhat shadowed the G7/8 finance ministers, the 
inclusion of emerging economies has also seen those economies strengthen their 
position. The need for emerging economies, such as the BRICS and Korea, to get on 
board in order to get the world economy back on track after the 2008 economic crisis, 
seems to simply have been too big for those economies not to gain considerable clout 
vis-à-vis the G7/8-members of the G20. This has had bearings on the G20 agenda. For 
instance, on institutional reform, the G20 leaders have together voiced the need for 
more reform in existing institutions.  
 
As this study shows, the G20 – unlike the G7/8 – has specified the need for a broader 
membership of emerging economies in the earlier Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and in 
the IMF, as well as for better collaboration between those two bodies. While 
representation has long been on the G7/8 agendas, it seems that the addition of 
emerging economies has pushed institutional reform a little higher on the agenda. The 
effect of the G20 is interesting in this matter. For, not only has the G20 – both at a 
finance ministers’ and at a leaders’ level – kept the issue of changes to voting power and 
representation on the agenda; it has also provided a forum in which emerging 
economies can coordinate their positions on the issue and thereby bargain harder for 
changes. This has been particularly clear in the negotiations on the credit-lines offered 
by a group of countries to the IMF, thereby permitting it to lend more, if necessary. Due 
to the lack of a significant voice as to when the credit lines could be activated, emerging 
economies were hesitant in the aftermath of the crisis to extend credit lines. After 
considerable negotiation, however, China, Brazil, Russia and India succeeded in pushing 
for an arrangement by which the four of them could collectively veto the activation of 
the credit lines (Woods 2010a: 54-57; Woods 2010b: 9-10). 
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One way in which the G20 does not differ very much from the G7/8 is that of assistance 
to the weakest in the system (Woods, 2010b: 10). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon 
has several times urged leaders of the G20 economies to take urgent steps to help the 
poor and vulnerable to make ends meet through investment. During a working dinner in 
Toronto in June 2010 he asked the G20 not to “… balance budgets on the backs of the 
world’s poorest people” (UN, 2010). Yet, the issue of development assistance and 
mitigating the impact of the crisis on developing countries is one on which the inclusion 
of the emerging economies into the centre of global governance appears to have left less 
of a mark (Woods, 2010b: 10). This has not changed considerably during Korea’s turn as 
host of the G20. 
 
4.4 The G20 and Ideational Change  
As the analysis over the two previous sections has shown, there is a discrepancy 
between the changes that have taken place in the material realm and those that have 
occurred in the institutional realm. Although the material shifts in global governance are 
formidable and have indeed created considerable alterations of the global governance 
structures, some of the adjustments initiated by the G20 in the institutional realm 
appear to strengthen the pillars of the global governance system rather than to replace 
them. The only African G20 member, South Africa’s moderate reformist trend in 
multilateral diplomacy, aimed at ‘fixing’ neo-liberalism provides an interesting example 
in this regard (Nel, Taylor and Westhuizen 2001).  
 
While South Africa has arguably taken a more critical approach to global governance on 
political matters over the past years it has not done so in the economic realm (Jordaan 
2010: 88). Considering that the African National Congress’ (ANC) supporters were 
mostly poor blacks in an extremely unequal society, that its allies all lay to the left and 
that, before assuming power, it had promised a redistribution of wealth, many had 
expected that the leading political party of post-apartheid South Africa would have 
opted for strongly interventionist and redistributive economic policies. However, after 
some initial hesitation the ANC has, with its Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy, embraced neoliberalism, which is an integral part of the foundation of the 
current global governance architecture.  
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This liberal approach – which falls under what Cox (1996: 87-90) labels as ‘problem 
solving’, as it does not question the power relations that underpin the international 
order or how this order came into existence – has traditionally found most support from 
the industrialised states of the West, who all benefit from the status quo. Variously 
described by use of dubious labels such as a ‘regional leader’, an ‘emerging power’ and a 
‘middle-tier state’, South Africa is also a country that has benefitted from the status quo. 
For, while the Western members of the G20 have benefitted from an economy in which 
neoliberal thought has a central place, the non-Western members of the group have too 
– some arguably even more so than their Western counterparts. After all, it is in a 
neoliberal world order that those countries have grown to a stature securing them an 
invitation to the table of global governance, through a place in the G20. 
 
Hence, rather than question the foundations upon which the neoliberal order has been 
built, South Africa, and other non-G7/8 members of the G20 have tried to soften its 
edges, by seeking debt relief and more aid and investment for poorer countries. South 
Africa was amongst the countries campaigning for a change to the IMF’s voting rules in 
favour of developing countries. The country's former finance minister, Trevor Manuel, is 
currently the chair of the IMF committee charged with its reform. South Africa is also 
amongst the members of the G20 left outside the G7/8, who at the WTO have been 
demanding that the Western governments adhere to the free trade doctrine they 
espouse; specifically, that they accept the liberalisation of their agricultural markets 
(Jordaan 2010: 87). This is an interesting point: while accepting neoliberal global 
governance, some of the non-G7/8 members of the G20 club of global governance seek 
greater consistency in the application of global economic rules. In that sense, they might 
even be argued to embrace world system more than the old G7 powers.  
 
Meanwhile, some of the members of the G20 who are not part of the G7/8 need to be 
cautious of embracing the policies of the traditional system in order to safeguard their 
ambitions of regional leadership. Again, South Africa provides a relevant example. South 
Africa wants to be a leader of the developing world and of Africa in particular. That 
South Africa is seen by some as such a leader is suggested by frequent invitations to 
G7/8 summits; its position as the only African member of the G20; and that it has been 
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chair of the Commonwealth, African Union, Southern African Development Community, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the United Nations Security Council. However, the country’s embrace of free 
trade has caused tensions with its economically less-advanced African neighbours. With 
millions of poor people of its own, South Africa has been trying to exploit its regional 
economic superiority and seek further liberalisation and integration of African 
economies. An agenda which has not been realised, amongst others because the elite in 
South Africa’s neighbouring countries have not been thrilled by the idea of spreading 
liberal order in Southern Africa (Taylor 2006).  
 
4.4.1 New Group, Same Ideas? 
The slogan for when France hosted the G20 summit in 2011 was “New World. New 
Ideas”. But how new are the ideas underpinning the G20? 
 
Both when gathered at a ministerial level in 1999 and  
when initiated at a summit level in 2008 the G20 was 
created as a high capacity institution to make important  
decisions, deliver them, and develop global governance 
in response to financial crisis. In so doing, however, it 
may be argued that the core principles it diffuses are 
those of G7/8, such as open democracy, individual 
liberty and social advancement. 
 
Co-founder of the G8 research group and founder of the 
G20 research group, John Kirton, supports the notion 
that the values promoted by the G20 at a ministerial 
level are closely tied to those traditionally supported by 
the G7/8 (Kirton 2005). The set of actions taken by the G20 in reaction to the 2008 
global economic crisis suggests that neoliberal thought, including principles of free-
market thinking and capitalism, continue to shape the outlook of the group even after it 
began its dual existence. The boosting of the old Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and 
the World Bank, as well as the substantial bailout packages agreed upon, are examples 
of this.  
Figure 4.1  (G20 France 2011 logo) 
Source: G20 (2011a)       
s 
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One might think of several reasons for the G20 to allow the ideas of the G7/8 to form a 
central guiding element in its work. Firstly, G7/8-countries remain amongst the 
strongest members of the G20, giving them considerable influence over the course the 
group is taking. However, the constructivist notion of diffusion could shed some further 
light on the dynamics allowing conventional neoliberalist thought to occupy a central 
place in the thought and actions of the G20. For, while the orientation towards 
neoliberal thought may be driven by the fact that the members of the G20 see that 
strand of thought as superior to others, there is the additional possibility that the 
convergence around those ideas is driven as much by the desire for acceptance, 
symbolic legitimacy and status as it is driven by the search for efficacy. For non-G7/8 
members of the G20, embracing the ideational goods of the established world order is a 
way to signal to various communities that they are part of the club and are supporting 
modern ideas and techniques. Since the Second World War it may be argued that the 
ideas of neoliberal free-market thinking have acquired somewhat of a normative status. 
International norms help to organise world politics, define the purpose of state activities, 
and shape what counts as acceptable behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). 
Eastern European countries seeking entry into the European Union adopt the values of 
the Union not only because they believe that they are superior, but also because they are 
the price of admission. Likewise, it is conceivable that non-G7/8 members see the 
embrace of neoliberal thought as a precondition for inclusion in the G20; after all, the 
membership of the G20 was determined by the G7/8-countries. In the same way as 
Third World states may accept the IMF’s recommendations not only to secure IMF loans 
but also to receive its seal of approval to facilitate access to global capital markets, G20 
members may see it as beneficial to accept the neoliberal ideational basis of the US-
hegemon.  
 
Also, constructivist thought suggests that states are likely to adopt those models that are 
perceived as successful or legitimate in periods of uncertainty (Barnett 2006: 265). Even 
in the absence of evidence that neoliberal thought is superior to other practices, states 
frequently adopt those models. Finally, one should remain conscious not only of which 
particular countries are represented in the G20, but also of the background of the 
individuals representing those countries in G20 meetings. After all, the choices as to how 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  73 
to confront a challenge are likely to be shaped by informal interactions and formal 
settings such as universities in general and postgraduate programmes in particular. 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s study of norm emergence provides an elegant account of how 
once established, standards can easily become the ‘industry standard’ and the accepted 
way of addressing problems in an area. The diffusion of the ‘Washington Model’ around 
the world is not owed merely to the demands imposed by the US and the IMF, but also to 
the fact that economists in other countries’ finance ministries are trained in broadly 
similar ways in postgraduate programmes in the West (ibid.). This concern of the life- 
cycle of norms is one Finnemore and Sikkink share with Cox. Although many 
international norms have a taken-for-granted quality, they have to have come from 
somewhere (Finnemore and Sikking 1998: 894-905; Cox 1981:128). 
 
The set of reactions to the 2008 global economic crisis chosen by the G20 may also in 
part be seen to challenge neoliberalism; state intervention has been the main recipe to 
save the global financial market. However, the resurgence of state intervention is not 
necessarily something that runs counter to the logic of neoliberalism. Marxist theorist 
David Harvey claims that it is a myth that neoliberalist thought demands the retreat of 
the state. Rather, such intervention – which at first glance appears to run counter to the 
logic of neoliberalism, emphasising the importance of freedom of the market – is 
necessary to save the neoliberal system of capitalism and individualism (Harvey 2009). 
Thus, while enquiring into whether the ideas underlying the G20 may further a change 
in – or away from – the neoliberal system, it is necessary to examine the consequences 
of the actions that those ideas have been translated into.  
 
An important critique of neoliberalism is that it contributes to the consolidation of class 
power, by collecting the assets available in increasingly fewer hands (Harvey 2009). 
Whether intended or not, a consequence of neoliberal faith in the idea of continuous 
growth contributes to this. The 2008 global economic crisis seems to disprove the idea 
held by some that the global economy is not a zero-sum game. The idea of a ‘new 
economy’, in which technological advancement and new bubbles would create space for 
continued, everlasting growth which became dominant throughout the 1980s and until 
the present crisis (Claes 2006) today appears flawed in the face of the 2008 global 
economic crisis. Nevertheless, the question posed by the G20 appears to be how it can 
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reconstitute the neoliberal capitalist system, although in a slightly more regulated, 
benevolent form (Harvey, 2009). As pointed out earlier, the approach of the G20 has 
revealed a group that is wary of challenging the fundamentals of the global system in 
which they have prospered. Rather, the G20 has agreed on bailout packages of 
unprecedented size to save that system. Whether intended or not, the dynamic following 
from those bailout packages has contributed to class consolidation, as they make the 
broader global population pay in order to keep the assets of those receiving the 
packages intact.  
 
In short, the impact of the G20 on the global order seems to be that it is attempting to 
reinvent the system without challenging the fundamental, neoliberal values of free trade, 
capitalism and individualism.  Some analysts have described G20 policy as placing 
scaffolding over a decaying building without trying to repair the underlying structure 
(Auerback, 2009). Notably, the G20 has not pointed to neoliberal policies as an element 
causing the 2008 global economic crisis. On the contrary, it has suggested neoliberal 
policies to get out of the crisis. According to Panitch, the significance of the G20 Toronto 
meeting in 2009 was to encourage every major capitalist country to commit themselves 
to continue with neoliberalist, capitalist, globalisation (Panitch 2010). For the Marxist, 
seeing neoliberalism as a theory consolidating class power, the effect of G20 summitry is 
therefore a further consolidation of class power, rather than a challenge to it (Harvey, 
2009). Thus, while the shape and size of the G20 may provide some hope of positive 
change for the weakest in the global system – through increased representation – the 
actions taken by the organisation thus far do not seem to alter the global order 
considerably in favour of the weakest. Instead, the approach of the G20 seems to be 
fundamentally problem-solving, looking at how it might mould the existing system to 
work most efficiently, rather than challenging that system through critical evaluation. 
This is perhaps not surprising, given the above-described origin of the G20 as a crisis-
buster. The aim of helping stem the deepening and broadening vulnerability that a 
rapidly globalising system brings about is still a central task, and does not – in the short 
term – allow for a fundamentally critical approach; in attempting to revive – or restore – 
the system one needs to focus on how best to modify that system in a way that makes it 
work. 
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4.4.2 Perceptions of the G20 and the Change Accompanying it 
Relative shifts in power relations are not new, nor are transformations in the 
institutional realm. Yet they seem to have been given more significance with the 2008 
global economic crisis. Just as for Rosamond (2003: 663) globalisation only acquires 
reality when it becomes part of the ‘assumptive worlds’ of policy actors, this study 
argues that the relative shifts in global power relations seem to have acquired more 
relevance once they were perceived by the actors of the international system.  
 
Statements of the G20 are interesting and reveal important aspects of the wider 
perception of the group. Structures and institutions are made by human action, but to 
understand structural and institutional change one needs to understand changes in 
what Vico refers to as the ‘mind’, that is, in people’s understanding of and attitude 
towards their environment. People can use the same terms and give them different 
meanings (Cox in interview with Dale and Robertson 2003: 17). This study therefore 
retains a conscious view of the role of ideas in the changes related to the G20, as well as 
of the descriptions of the G20 and the change it represents.  
 
Drawing on Vichian thought, Cox emphasises that ideas have bi-directional relationships 
with both material conditions and institutions; in other words they are not determined 
by them. Human beings have relationships with social, political and economic 
phenomena, and act upon them, by having ideas about them. The change in the 
ideational world, therefore, may be at least as significant as the changes in the material 
world. After all, the studies referred to under the account of the material change in 
global governance earlier in this study reveal that the shifting of power towards 
emerging economies is not something new. With the 2008 global economic crisis such 
changes seem to have become more apparent to actors of international relations, who 
have been forced to integrate them into their understandings of how best to meet the 
global governance problems caused by the financial crisis. Turning to a constructivist 
vocabulary, one might say that it is perhaps reality per me that has changed with the G20, 
as much as it is reality per se. 
 
A closer look at statements about, and descriptions of, the G20 reveals that the group is 
seen in quite different ways. For US President Obama, the G20 is “the most diverse 
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collection of leaders in history” (White House 2009b). Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister He 
Yafei supports the notion of the G20 as a more representative body of financial and 
economic governance, stating “the G-20 has … vitality and can represent the views of 
various countries in a balanced way”. This, Yafei adds, stands in contrast to the G7/8, 
which “lacks wide representation” (Associated Press 2009).  
 
For others, however, twenty may not be enough. Representing a country less included in 
the G20 process, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmet Aboul Gheit voiced concern, 
pointing out that “countries that are considered important players” need seats at the 
G20 table, too. He went on to urge the G20 to “[l]isten to the rest of the world” and not to 
“…turn it into a closed club as it was with the G8” (ibid.). This latter statement is 
particularly interesting, as it confirms an increasingly widely held view that the G20 is 
not only an institution working side by side with the G7/8, but that it is indeed replacing 
the group.  
 
 Amongst the analogies and key words used most frequently in characterisations of the 
group and its work we find: ‘stability’, ‘crisis-buster’ (Cooper and Bradford 2010), 
‘coordinator’ (International Business Times, 2009), ‘facilitator’, ‘forum for discussion’, ‘a 
global steering committee’ (Chosunilbo 2010), or a space to ‘develop common positions 
on complex issues’ (China Daily 2010; G20, 2011). Common to these descriptions and 
key words is that they reflect a notion of the G20 as a forum for stability and system-
preservation, rather than one for challenging the system. Although the G20 could be 
seen by some as a forum for the South to pressure the North, through greater 
representation from emerging markets, the G20 has thus far been involved in promoting 
stability. As suggested in the second chapter of this thesis, the initiation of G20 meetings, 
both at a ministerial level and at a summit level, is intimately linked to the governance 
challenges that are tied up with financial instability. In fact, the creation of the group, 
both at a ministerial and at a leaders level, may be seen as a reaction to crisis in the 
financial market. In some ways, financial crises constitute the very opposite of stability 
and order (Claes, Hveem and Tranøy 2006:155). Such crises shake the established 
system and the capitalist and free-market thinking engrained in it and could lead to an 
increased questioning of the ideas underlying that system. As a historical structure 
changes, the ‘common sense’ of reality changes. Such mutations of a seemingly fixed 
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historical structure might occur gradually or more suddenly (Cox in interview with 
Schouten 2009: 2). While there has long been a demand for more representative forums 
of global governance, it may be argued that the widespread acceptance the G20 enjoys 
amongst key economies tells the story of a shift of the latter type. In particular, the US’s 
embrace of the G20 – illustrated by the above statement by Obama – suggests that the 
2008 global economic crisis seems to have made it ‘common sense’ that a group of seven 
or eight economies can no longer lead the world. 
 
The question as to how the US will adapt to a world it no longer can presume to lead is 
an interesting one. Cox (2009: 2) believes that the challenge of getting the US to 
understand and to be party to an adjustment to a new world order is a daunting one, not 
least because the adaption to such a new reality by other countries depends on the US 
taking the lead towards understanding its role as that of one great power amongst 
others.  
 
“The moment Obama got elected was a moment that represented the possibility of such a change 
in American society, yet one year later, in terms of international relations, he has appointed all the 
people associated with the previous administration. So while there is now, because of Obama, a 
difference in the mode of expression of American power (Obama is much more sympathetic to the 
rest of the world than the rather aggressively dominant Bush/Cheney presidency), that power is 
directed in the same way as before.” (Cox, 2009: 2). 
 
Cox (2009: 2) compares the current position of the US with that of the dwindling 
hegemon Great Britain after the Second World War. No longer able to sustain its 
position as a world leader, Britain adopted a policy of withdrawal and turned over key 
international problems to the United States. Cox points out that while, in structural 
terms, nothing changed much at that moment in terms of dominance in world order, 
Britain managed to adapt to its new role. Thus far, the US does not seem prepared to do 
the same. Cox sees this seeming determinism regarding the role of the US in the 
contemporary world order to have major implications for domestic social forces, and to 
be called into question by the crisis in the world economy (ibid.). Attention to this 
gradual mutation of ‘common sense’ in the US and elsewhere is important, as it might 
point us towards the contingency of the prevailing order. Moreover, one should remain 
aware of what events and what actors may contribute to the changing, or non-changing, 
of minds. While it has already been stated that there is a clear link between material 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  78 
change and ideational change, it is clear that ideas might also come from the minds of 
others.  
 
Again, Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) study of norm emergence appears useful. A 
variety of ‘norm brokers’, be they from the IMF, the World Bank or from the finance 
ministries of G20 members have sought to convince the G20 that the idea of economic 
orthodoxy – the dominant hegemonic idea at the world order level – is the only 
‘common sense’ approach to stabilise and run the global economy. It is important to 
remind oneself how informal inter-action between individuals shapes the thought of the 
G20. The roots of the G20 go back to a group called the G1043 in the 1960s. The group 
began meeting at a ministerial level when the arrangement made after 1945 to use the 
American dollar, tied to gold, as the global currency began to fall apart, but had by the 
mid-1970s turned into a meeting open to the heads of state. From 1975 to 1976 and 
onwards the group followed closely the ideology of neoliberalism (Panitch 2010). Just as 
with the G20 today, however, the meetings taking place amongst these leaders are not 
the only ones of importance. The duration of a G20 summit is simply too short and the 
complexity of the discussions during those meetings too great, for the leaders to be able 
to make the decisions that are required. Amongst the most important meetings, 
therefore, are those meetings of finance ministries and permanent finance officials. 
During such meetings, those involved socialise and get to know each other. Not only do 
they attend meetings together; they go to dinners together and exchange personal 
phone numbers, to do international fire-fighting and coordination. American economist 
Paul Volcker and Chairman of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board under President 
Barack Obama from February 2009 until January 2011 (White House, 2009c) has been 
at the centre of the G10 and G20 process since the 1960s and has been quoted as saying 
that “…it is not the communiqué that matters; it is getting to know each other that 
matters, it's developing a commitment to each other that matters, and indeed 
committing ourselves to convince our heads of state to do things that we think is 
necessary for coordination” (Panitch 2010). Hence, the manner in which the G20 
process affects the minds and ideas of those involved in it may also affect the G20 
process in itself. 
                                                        
43 Consisting initially of Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Germany and Sweden (IMF 2011) 
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4.5 Approaching a Conclusion  
This chapter has broken down some notable changes in global governance related to the 
G20 into a material, an institutional and an ideational dimension, and studied them in 
turn. However, as it embraces a Coxian, process-oriented understanding of the world, it 
also recognises that these dimensions are interconnected. It suffices to look at the 
membership of the G20 to understand that material power determines the shape of 
institutions – the “systemically important” members which are allowed access to the 
institution are all amongst the strongest economies in the world. Hence, while 
deconstruction is an integral part of the method of this study, it also accepts that the 
pieces of global governance cannot readily be separated from each other.  
 
Through deconstructing the changes related to G20, this study has established both that 
change is happening in the material, the institutional and the ideational realm, and that 
these affect each other. But in puzzling back together the elements of change studied in 
the various dimensions – so that they form a larger picture of the change the G20 
represents – it becomes clear that the larger picture that appears when one draws 
together the observations made in this study is open for interpretation. In particular, the 
implications of those changes for the world order are not evident. Do the material and 
institutional shifts related to the G20 suggest that the world is – to put it bluntly – 
turning upside down? The answer to the question of how the G20 is shaping global 
governance depends considerably upon the manner in which one puzzles back together 
the fragments of change studied above. In other words, the ontology and epistemology 
adopted is decisive of what one sees. This study has used analytical tools from critical 
theory and constructivism – both arguably post-positivist theories.  
 
From what has been discussed, the G20 seems to affect global governance in several 
ways. The spontaneous reaction within the global system as it experiences change 
seems to be to restore itself. While one way to do so may be to try to restore balance 
through a change of the first order – a change within the system – another may be to 
change the system itself, through a change of the second order.  
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One way for the current configuration of the world order to restore balance through a 
change of ‘the first order’ is to do ‘more of the same’, for example by the US trying to take 
an even more active hegemonic role than it is currently doing. According to Cox, 
however, the revival of hegemony in decline is not a likely scenario in the world today. 
Neither is a new hegemony founded by one single dominant power, such as China for 
instance (Cox 1992b). Rather, with the trends that dominated the context in which Cox 
wrote at the time, he found the most likely option to be a revival of the universal values 
and understandings of the declining hegemony, supported by a few powerful states in 
agreement (ibid.). The above discussion of the ideas underlying G20 action suggests that 
this may not be a poor guess; with its embrace of the neoliberal values supported by the 
US-led G7/8, the G20 may be seen as such a group. With the recent events in the 
financial markets and the global economy, it is not unlikely that the foundation of such 
values will undergo some revision before they are once again embraced. The discussion 
of this research reveals that although there has arguably been a lack of fundamental 
reform from the G20, the non-G7/8 members appear interested in revising the system 
so as to better accommodate their needs.  Yet, the study has shown that the G20 has thus 
far not taken steps towards a complete rejection of the ideas related to the US hegemony. 
The G20’s revisions of the ideas and institutions of global governance find themselves 
safely within the category of changes belonging to the first order of change. 
 
Changes of the second order entail changing the very system of global governance. Cox – 
particularly in his later work (O’Brien 2002) – seems to be open to the possibility of a 
change of the second order, through a change to a non-hegemonic or pluralist order; an 
order without universal values, where rivalling states or regional blocs compete for 
global leadership (Cox 1992b). This prediction should not be looked upon without 
interest when studying the G20. The formation of blocs is one of the major potential 
challenges of the G20. As the waves of the financial crisis are diminishing in strength and 
the immediacy of the crisis subsides, it is not evident that the G20 will succeed in 
avoiding internal fracturing. Are members of the G20 prepared to let the group remain 
the ‘hub’ of their primary focus in terms of international organisation or will they 
reorientate their focus to smaller, more like-minded groups? Some evidence suggests 
that the privileging of like-mindedness has gained some momentum since the 2009 
Pittsburgh Summit (Cooper and Bradford 2010: 10). At the G7 finance ministers’ 
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meeting in Iqaluit in February 2010 the G7/8 format went back to its organisational 
roots, embracing a more informal style, with a stripped down agenda and no formal 
communiqué. Beltrame (2010) quotes one Canadian official to argue that such an 
organisational format was considered to be the model for the ongoing structure: “There 
is likely merit in making sure those who are likeminded and who rely on each other for 
trade and commerce and investment have some sort of united front”. 
 
The risk of the G7/8 becoming a caucus group within the G20 both in terms of 
organisation – by positioning the G7/8 meeting before the G20 – and focus – amongst 
other manifested in the more aid-centric view of development of the G7/8 than the G20 
– represents a considerable challenge for the G20 (Cooper and Bradford 2010). 
Moreover, it could contribute to the hardening of the disconnections between the G7/8 
and the most powerful emerging states within the G20. There are several potential 
constellations of countries within the G20 that might become counterparts to the G7/8. 
Amongst them is the BRICs, and/or IBSA, or possibly the modern G5 – also called the 
Outreach Five; India, China, Brazil South Africa and Mexico – from the Hellingdamm-
L’Aquila Process. More pronounced divisions within the G20 might offset the ability of 
the Group to maintain its success as a dynamic forum for decision-making in global 
governance. The potential for less agreement within the G20 raises question as to what 
the impact of the G20 on global cooperation is likely to be in the long term.  
 
Thus, as this study draws towards a conclusion, it can be noted that critical examination 
of the changes in global governance brought about, and embodied by, the G20 reveals 
that the answer to how changes in global governance should be interpreted – and to 
what the role of the group is in those changes – is complex and multifaceted. The 
dynamic interplay between the three dimensions here studied does not allow for simple 
conclusions. Neither do the analytical tools the study has made use of. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that considerable changes are happening within global governance, and that the 
role of the G20 is pivotal to understand those changes. 
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5 Conclusion  
 
5.1 Studying Changes in Global Governance through the Case of the G20 
As stated at the outset of this research endeavour, the 2008 global economic crisis 
brought much attention to the issue of changes in global governance. The goal of this 
research has been to critically examine some of those changes through the case of the 
G20. This concluding chapter presents some of the main findings of the study, and says 
something about their relevance to the research aims stated in the first chapter, before it 
devotes some space to the question of why the G20 is important in the study of global 
governance. Finally, it makes some suggestions for what areas future research on the 
field might direct its attention towards.  
 
Based on the analysis of this study, one might say that the crisis revealed a vacuum in 
global governance. As the analysis in this research has shown, shifts in global economic 
power relations, and – notably – in the perceptions of such power relations, have made 
it clear that the world is changing. Yet, when this study was undertaken, relatively little 
analytical, in-depth, research had been done to clarify the nature and significance of 
those changes. Even today, scholarly effort on the subject remains limited. This is 
particularly true for studies taking a critical approach. This study has attempted to help 
fill that void in the global governance literature, by providing an initial step towards a 
more critical approach to the role of the G20.  
 
The analytical tools the study has pursued that aim with are to be found primarily 
within the critical theory of Robert Cox. With his holistic, and dynamic framework, 
emphasising the importance of the interlinked and interacting triad of ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions, Coxian Critical Theory provides a set of sophisticated tools 
for the study of change. In particular, the importance placed on ideational change for 
understanding transformation makes Cox’s work interesting. In addition, the study has 
borrowed tools from the constructivist body of thought. While this should not be 
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understood as a critique of Cox, the nuanced and advanced view of the role of norms and 
ideas that constructivism offers has proved useful for a further exploration of the role of 
ideas, perceptions, and the “assumptive worlds” Cox describes. In particular, Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s (2001) emphasis on agents of social construction and norm entrepreneurs, 
contributing to the changing of social understandings, offered interesting perspectives 
of the changes studied. 
 
Inspired by the Coxian framework, the aim of critically examining some of the changes in 
global governance embodied by, and emerging from, the creation of the G20 and its 
increasingly important role since the 2008 global economic crisis has been achieved 
through a deconstruction of such changes into three dimensions of global governance – 
namely, the material, institutional and ideational dimensions. In so doing, the study has 
remained clear on the significance of studying the interactive relationship between 
those dimensions; in order to better understand changes in any of the dimensions, it is 
necessary to study them in conjunction with the other two. 
 
Materially speaking, a main finding of the chapter is that the economic power relations 
between central actors in global governance have undergone a significant shift. Although 
the already marginalised groups within developing economies face even lower 
standards of living and increasing poverty in the wake of the 2008 global economic 
crisis, economic growth is bringing non-Western developing countries into the top ranks 
of global governance. While the size of the US economy ensures that it remains a global 
leader, it seems clear that the relative strengthening of countries such as the BRICS does 
impact on the nature and development of global governance.  
 
The study of institutional change confirms this. After all, through the inclusion of 
emerging economies into the G20, new actors achieve influence over the manner in 
which power is distributed, through creating and recreating the global governance 
system. While at the outset, the G20 and the measures it took to manage the 2008 global 
economic crisis appeared ad hoc or temporary, the decision at the Pittsburgh Summit in 
September 2009 to institutionalise the G20 at a summit level marks a shift in the locus of 
global leadership. The G20 has brought about transformation in global governance, 
signalling a break with the established system of institutions for managing global affairs. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  84 
In particular, the study has looked at how the G20 has driven change in the IMF, the 
World Bank and the Financial Stability Forum. It seems clear that while the Bretton 
Woods institutions remain central in the institutional framework of global governance, 
the inclusion of non-Western economies in the G20 has had an impact on the priorities 
and shape of those organisations. Yet, as this chapter argues, the systemic change does 
not fully mirror the extent of the changes that have taken place in the material realm. 
The discussion of this chapter concludes that this might in part be explained through the 
lack of qualitative change in the ideational dimension. 
 
This study has retained a conscious view of the role of ideas in the changes related to the 
G20, as well as of the descriptions of the G20 and the change it represents. In studying 
what ideational change the G20 has brought about in global governance, one 
observation has been that the shifts in relative power relations, as well as the 
transformations in the institutional realm, seem to have acquired more significance in 
the minds of some with the 2008 global economic crisis and the creation of the G20.  
 
A study of changes in global governance should not be limited to a study of tangible 
aspects of changes such as the material and the institutional changes. After all, it is only 
when such changes become part of what Rosamond (2003: 663) labels the assumptive 
worlds of policy actors that they begin to shape the policies of states. Studying 
statements of the G20 made by central figures from states such as China, Egypt and the 
US it became clear that the understandings and attitudes of those persons – or, what 
Vico refers to as their ‘minds’ – are increasingly recognising the importance of the G20 
as a central body of global governance. Once perceived, the changes in the material and 
institutional realm of global governance which the G20 represents and embodies seem 
to have contributed to a gradual transformation of ‘common sense’, both in the 
developed and in the developing world.  
 
It is no longer up to the US to lead the world on its own. Rather, it must negotiate the 
course of global governance with an increasingly wide circle of states. Yet, the study has 
shown that the norms and ideas that underlie the G20 remain closely tied with those 
guiding the G7/8. A variety of ‘norm brokers’, be they from the IMF, the World Bank or 
from the finance ministries of G20 members, have sought to convince the G20 that the 
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idea of economic orthodoxy – the dominant hegemonic idea at the world order level – is 
the only ‘common sense’ approach to stabilise and run the global economy. Institutions 
are, as Cox (1981:99) sees them, a way to stabilise and perpetuate a particular world 
order. As long as the absence of considerable disjuncture between the ideas of the G7/8 
and those of the G20 remains, the potential for alternative paths of development 
remains limited. Similarly, however, the potential for structural change is considerable if 
the intersubjective understandings, which constitute common ground of social discourse 
in the historical context in which the G20 currently operates, experiences a more 
considerable challenge from alternative collective understandings.  
 
Three questions of particular importance to understanding, and adapting to, the changes 
in global governance related to the G20 have guided the selection of issues dealt with in 
the analysis. These are, firstly; what role does the G20 occupy in global governance?, 
secondly; how does the G20 affect global cooperation?, and, finally; what kind of a shift 
in global governance relations does the G20 embody? 
 
5.2 The Role of the G20 in, and Its Impact on, Global Governance  
The role of the G20 in global governance was dealt with both in the second and fourth 
chapters of this study. Firstly, it is clear that the G20, like the Gs that preceded it, 
represents something of an oddity in global governance. It does not have the trappings 
of an international organisation, nor is it an institution in a traditional sense. Rather, the 
group may be described as a forum, through which the twenty most “systemically 
important” economies in global governance can coordinate their national policies on 
certain issues. Secondly, while those issues have thus far remained within the economic 
sphere of governance, the study suggests that a widening of the range of areas dealt with 
by the G20 is not unlikely. Thirdly, there is little doubt that the G20 today occupies a 
perfectly central place in global governance. It is by far the strongest constellation of 
countries in the world, and acts as the centrepiece, or ‘hub’ institution, of global 
economic governance. Yet, both the historical roots of the group – which remain 
intimately tied to the G7/8 – and its actions today draw into question whether the G20 
represents a change within the framework of global governance, or whether it 
represents a change of the global governance system itself. 
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Dealing with the question of how the G20 affects global cooperation, the study makes 
clear that the group is commonly seen as an example of how global governance is 
gradually becoming more multilateral. For instance, the G20s boosting of an 
organisation such as the IMF has even led some to see the group as a revival of a 
multilateralism that was waning prior to the 2008 global economic crisis (Woods 
2010a). However, through critical examination, this study has revealed that the group 
may also represent an obstacle to effective multilateral governance. Through widening 
the inner circle of global governance, one simultaneously increases the perceived cost 
for those left outside. Just as India might prefer to work though the G20, rather than the 
UN – in which it does not occupy a regular seat in the Security Council –, it is perceivable 
that countries marginalised by the G20 process might attempt to find different bodies of 
governance to work through. Moreover, by “saving” the IMF, the G20 might be argued to 
be acting as a conservator of the system, as much as a protagonist for change. This 
directed the analysis towards the final of the three research aims of the thesis; namely, 
the question concerning the kind of change in global governance that the G20 brings 
about. 
 
5.3 Changing the Order but not the System 
In answer to the question concerning the type of shift in global governance embodied by 
the G20, the observation that the membership of the group is intimately tied up with 
power politics is revealed. For instance, the criteria for deciding which economies are 
amongst the twenty most “systemically significant” are non-existent. The fact that both 
the membership of the group was determined by, and the first gathering of it was 
initiated by, the G7/8, is one worthy of note. Particularly, it draws attention to the extent 
that the G20 differs from the G7/8.  
 
Regardless of the perspective one chooses, the creation of the G20 is a recognition, 
amongst other by the US, that change is needed in global governance. However, there is 
no single answer to what impact the changes that the G20 brings about are. The analysis 
of this study suggests that although it is clear that the distribution of economic power 
has undergone and is still to undergo significant alterations, little attempt has been 
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made to overturn the old order and completely reorganise the rules and institutions of 
the system. Rather, G20 members seem to work towards a strengthening of the pillars of 
the system, thereby reviving the universal values and understandings of the declining US 
hegemony. Although the non-G7/8 members of the G20 appear to be interested in 
revising the system so as to better accommodate their needs, the G20’s revisions of the 
ideas and institutions of global governance are of a first order – creating changes within 
the system, but not transforming the system itself. Given Cox’s contention that we can 
only depict future structures in terms of a “… negation or potential negation of the 
dominant tendencies we have known” (Cox 1992a: 150) this may not be a surprising 
development. The lack of ability to conceive of something qualitatively new does not 
only limit our ability to depict the future, but indeed also places restraints on our ability 
to create it. This should be part of an explanation for the tendency to work through the 
Bretton Woods institutions, and rely on the ideational heritage of the G7/8, rather than 
to replace those institutions and let oneself be guided by new ideas. 
 
5.4 Outlook: Why the G20 Matters, after all 
That the G20 has yet to alter the very system in which global governance takes place 
does not mean that the creation of the group has not had influence on global governance. 
While it may not have produced instantly different outcomes to those of the pre-existing 
G7/8, the discussion of this study has shown that the G20, through the inclusion of the 
non-G7/8 members into global governance, may have acquired a composition that sows 
seeds for change in the longer term. Although the composition of the G20 does not fully 
reflect the shift in global economic power, it is a recognition that such a shift is taking 
place. It has reinforced a growing concern about the anachronistic power balance in 
existing institutions of global economic governance, and might have created a blueprint 
for a group allowing for broader participation in global governance.  
 
Albeit finding itself within the category of first order change, the G20 embodies 
considerable change in global governance. For the first time in modern history, non-
western economies hold so much power that they are a force that cannot be overlooked. 
The standstill in the DOHA-round, the lack of action in the face of climate changes and 
the failure to agree on the best strategy to create a stable world economy in the future, 
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are all events which signify that the world currently lacks a clearly defined centre of 
gravity, capable of acting as a global leader. Even the search for a new head of the IMF 
underscores the fact that global governance has seen a tremendous rebalancing of 
power. Although it was clear from the beginning that Christine Lagarde was the most 
likely person to be chosen (Tiberghien 2011), the open debate on who was to succeed 
Strauss-Kahn as the leader of the IMF is interesting – and unprecedented. Emerging 
economies are no longer puppets to be pushed around by the stronger actors in global 
governance. Thus, drawing the conclusion that the G20 is a mere expansion of G7/8 rule, 
controlled by the US, is too simple. In the rapidly evolving field of G20 studies it is 
therefore imperative that one refrains from quick and simple conclusions.  
 
The story of the G20 is one that might be told in several ways. This study has sought a 
critical and nuanced approach. The G20 is not a rebellion against the US hegemony and 
its leading powers, nor is the G20 simply the attempt of countries previously confined to 
the status of marginal losers in global governance to share the top table with the most 
powerful negotiators. If one wishes to say something meaningful about the change that 
the G20 has made in global governance, one must put aside simplified interpretations in 
favour of a more sophisticated approach. It is also clear that the field of G20 studies is 
still in its infancy and in dire need of further research. 
 
5.5 Areas for Further Research:  
Integral to the motivation of the undertaking of this study was the lack of thorough 
scholarly engagement with the issue of how the G20 is affecting global governance. As 
the field of G20 studies grows, so does the amount of academic literature covering the 
group. Yet, the application of critical theory to the study of G20 remains limited.  
 
The focus of critical theory is diverse and might provide great analytical insight into the 
nature of the changes related to the G20. Particularly, the awareness of critical theory 
that power also can be structural (Strange 1988) makes such theory useful in 
approaching the consequences of the altering of the global structure the G20 represents. 
Future research should examine not only the tremendous power possessed by the G20 
in terms of its ability to redesign the international system; it should also critically 
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examine the context of which the G20 is a product and how that context has shaped the 
group.  
 
To date, most analysts have focused on the G20’s response to the 2008 global economic 
crisis. Less attention has been paid to the long-term effects of the G20 and where the 
group is headed. More attention should be given to the possible future developments in 
the G20 and global governance. One such development is the risk of internal fracturing 
in the G20.  
 
The internal efficacy of the G20 decision-making process has thus far been relatively 
high. Should fracturing within the group grow as the immediacy of the 2008 global 
economic crisis subsides, however, Cox’s scenario of smaller, more effective, (and 
probably rival) regional groups might become the preferred format for the exertion of 
governance. 
 
In an article published in Xinhua, China’s official news agency, following the G8/G20 
meetings in Toronto and the announcement that France will play host to next year’s 
summits, Indian professor of geopolitics M.D. Nalapat warns of the risk of a divide 
between the G8 countries and the rest of the G20 if the G8 continues to meet: “The G8 
needs to disband itself so that both developed and emerging countries can together 
work to resolve the problems facing humanity. Should it continue, then we need a G12”: 
 
When the G8 was expanded into the G20, it was expected that the new forum would set right the 
imbalance in global consultations on financial matters by ensuring that the voices of China, India 
and Brazil are heard before policy gets decided. In other words, just as the G7 became the G8, the 
G8 would become the G20 …. Instead, the G8 has continued, and has imposed a format whereby 
they meet in advance of the G20 summit and work out a common position that they then ask the 
other 12 countries to accept … If the G8 continues, then the ‘G12’ needs to meet in advance of such 
get-togethers the way the G8 does, so as to seek to find common positions on global issues. (Smith 
2010) 
 
Ever since the G8 started meeting with the Outreach 5 it has been clear that the G8 has 
not been able – or willing – to live up to the promise of treating all parties equally. This 
has forced the creation of Gs for those not included in the G8. The Outreach 5 decided to 
organise itself into a G5, also meeting separately prior to their meetings with the G8, and 
non-G8 members of the G20 seem to be establishing a G12 with regular meetings prior 
to G20 summits. 
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The idea that the G8 will focus on “strategic” and “security” issues, amongst others, 
expressed by European heads of state such as David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy 
(Smith 2010), is not likely to work in the long run. What happens if the G20 meets 
during a time of crisis in a realm other than the financial one? Are they simply going to 
ignore the elephant in the room? Smith (2010) points out that the agenda does not fall 
into issues that are either appropriate for the G8 or for the G20. Future studies should 
aim both at mapping the main threats to G20 unity44 and how these might be avoided, 
and what the consequences of an increasingly fragmented realm of global governance – 
marked by blocs such as the G7/8, the G5, the BRICS, the G12 and the G20 – might be in 
the face of an ever-increasing global interdependence. 
 
Another area of research upon which it would be interesting to shed some light has to do 
with the indirect influence that the G20 holds. While this study has focused mainly on 
how the G20 has affected global institutions directly, through reforms such as those 
made in the IMF and the World Bank, the more indirect impact of the G20 on other 
groups of global governance would be interesting to explore. The creation of the G20 has 
ripple effects beyond the direct influence of the group itself. Not only does the G20 
create or reform other bodies of governance, it also influences the shape of other groups. 
For instance: the choice of the G7/8 not to dismantle itself now that the G20 has been 
created, risks forcing the creation of a Group of 12 amongst those which are not part of 
the G7/8 process. Another, less formalised reaction to G20 summitry is increased 
cooperation amongst states that see themselves as overlooked in the G20 process. The 
increased coordination between Nordic countries aiming at increasing their influence in 
the G20 is a good example in this regard (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010). 
Moreover, one might imagine that a transformation of the manner in which the Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM) or the G77 works, now that prominent members within it 
also represent the interests of the West, might take place. 
 
Finally, while this study has only touched briefly on the subject, future research could 
                                                        
44 The reasons for the failure of putting problems such as development, failed states, nuclear proliferation 
and climate change on the agenda for the entire G20 membership could be imagined to be amongst the 
findings of such research.  
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concentrate on where the G20 seems to be positioning itself in relation to other central 
loci of power in the contemporary order. A particularly interesting subject in this regard, 
upon which I would have liked to elaborate in this study had there been room for it – is 
that of the relationship that the G20 is developing with the United Nations (UN). As the 
G20 countries are increasingly exercising leadership in global economic governance, the 
UN is left to play a secondary role in the handling of several important international 
issues. The G20 does not see itself as subordinate to the UN and does not ‘report’ to the 
UN for further consideration of its decisions before they go into effect. 
 
It seems to be a common academic and diplomatic viewpoint that the G20 and the UN 
are both necessary and must learn to cohabit. Some also see the possibility of the two 
bodies of global governance working in tandem, serving as complements, each group’s 
strengths balancing out the weaknesses of the other (Kristensen 2010). On the one hand, 
the G20 might very well mark the creation of a competitor to the UN in other areas if it 
chooses to expand its mandate. On the other hand, the G20 and the UN are bodies of 
governance with distinct advantages that might enable them to fill gaps left by the other. 
For instance, the UN faces great challenges related to bureaucracy and efficiency, 
while the G20, with its flexible structure, has the potential to be less bureaucratic, more 
efficient, and less weighed down by many of the problems that plague the UN because it 
is not constrained in the same way as a multilateral institution. Moreover, the G20 might 
enhance UN cooperation by ensuring better cooperation between the UN’s biggest 
members. Agreement on issues during a G20 summit can potentially smooth everyday 
business at the UN. Meanwhile, the G20 might benefit from the UN as well, in that the 
organisation provides a platform needed to garner the changes that they broker.  If the 
G20 wants to transform its decisions into reality it needs the legitimacy that the UN can 
provide.  
 
Further research on how the creation of the G20 has influenced the wider institutional 
and ideational realm might provide interesting insight not only into how global 
governance is shifting today, but also into what shape global governance might take in 
the future. 
 
The study of what G20 is and might become is both a challenging and interesting one. 
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Because the significance attributed to the G20, and thereby also much of its potential to 
contribute to structural and institutional change, is so intimately bound up with changes 
in the ‘mind’ – that is, in people’s understandings of and attitude towards their 
environment – its role in contributing to changes in global governance might change 
quickly. As becomes clear from the history of the G20, important events – such as the 
2008 global economic crisis – have the potential of altering the way in which we 
perceive the context within which we exist. What changed with the global governance 
was perhaps not so much the relative standing between key emerging economies and 
more established economies, or the importance of acting through the G20 instead of the 
G7/8, as it changed the understanding of the global governance landscape. Therefore, in 
order to better understand the impact of the creation of the G20, it is crucial that future 
studies on changes in global governance, and/or on the role of the G20, do not only 
study the material and institutional aspects, but also attempt to understand what role 
shifts in the assumptive worlds of both layman and scholar plays. As this study has 
pointed out, there is certainly room for more critical research on the issue of changes 
within global governance, both with regards to the G20 and in more general terms. 
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